On 24 Jul 2002 at 21:19, Hermit wrote:
> 
> Joe, it might have been kind to the congregation to note that statements about the nature of truths are relative to a quasi absolute (no matter how poorly defined) theoretical metaconstruct (the map). Statements about observations (the terrain) are relative to the observer (from a particular 
perspective). Thus these two kinds of statements, while seemingly congruent, are members of completely different classes of objects, are qualitatively different and attempting to compare them is utterly invalid.
> 
> Which, of course, would have dealt with Rhinoceros' confusion on this issue.
> 
> As we see, it is not too difficult to neutralize the arguments which Fish so signally failed to address - but from what we saw here, it appears that Fish could not develop an argument that would get him a drink in a brewery. 
> 
> Regards
> 
> Hermit
>
Truth-statements must be internally consistent (not self-contradictory), 
externally coherent (not contradict adjacent truths) and referentially 
correspondent (as abstract maps, or signs, they must indeed faithfully 
address or point to or refer to or represent a concrete terrain or object).  
nagel strongly makes the case that the statement "everything is 
subjective) fails on the first count, and existential/hermeneutic 
phenomenology, with its concept of intersubjectivity, makes the point 
that such a statement fails on the third.  While statements within an 
axiomatic system are relative to each other in the sense of mutual 
foundedness and contiguity, the system as a whole which the totality of 
such statements constructs must be taken as the objective referent for 
any of the statements of which it is comprised to possess either 
meaning or reference.  They must also be relative to the referent to 
which they point, i.e. the described lived-world of experience, which is 
itself apodictically primordial and a priori to any statements about it.  In 
fact, the very property of 'aboutness' which is critical to the identity of a 
statement qua statement is that which establishes is as derivative; i.e. 
in a state of existential dependence upon the world which it purports to 
describe.  That world itself cannot be said to be dependent upon 
anything for its existence, just dependent upon our perception of it for 
its appearance to us.
>
> ----
> This message was posted by Hermit to the Virus 2002 board on Church of Virus BBS.
> <http://virus.lucifer.com/bbs/index.php?board=51;action=display;threadid=25785>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sun Sep 22 2002 - 05:06:16 MDT