virus: Re:
Thu, 03 Oct 1996 14:24:14 -0600

On Tue, 1 Oct 1996 15:19:42 -0600 writes:
>Here's a few for you to balance what I consider a list that seems
>overflowing with Cartesian ideas:-

Which of the ideas which are over-represented on this list are you
calling Cartesian?

>BUTTON, G., COULTER, J., LEE, J.R.E. & SHARROCK, W.W., (1995)
><Computers, minds and conduct>, Polity Press.
>This is an excellent text which completely demolishes the Cartesian
>ideas put forward by Churchland and all his other AI cronies. It
>basically says that the work the neurophysiologists and
>are doing is great - they _know_ that all they are doing is explaining
>how the brain works - but that the "philosophical gloss" put on their
>work by Churchland & Co. is simply unacceptable and results from
>conceptual confusions about language.

Okay. Care to sum up any of the authors' arguments? If not, then I will
conclude that 1) you are excited about the book and would like for other
people to read it but you do not intend for us to place any weight on the
conclusions you've summed up for us, or 2) that you've made a fallacious
appeal to authority by reporting that BUTTON, G., COULTER, J., LEE,
J.R.E. & SHARROCK, W.W say that anything Paul and/or Patricia Churchland
have to say in response to the traditional concerns in the philosphy of
mind is bunk and that we Virions should concur on the basis that the
afore-mentioned authors consitute an authoritative source in a way in
which the Churchlands do not.

>They thus argue that the 'Ordinary Language Philosophy' of
>and Ryle (derided as 'folk psychology by Churchland et al) should be
>restored to its proper place in intellectual discourse, and that a
>careful examination of this work will reveal that "the" problem of
>as espoused by the cognitivists is really a chimera.

Paul Churchland argues that a matured neuro-science will vindicate
"folk-psychology" by uncovering the causal processes which govern the
psychological regularities which "folk-psychological" wisdom has
identified and formalized. This vindication will be similiar to the way
in which contemporary physics has vindicated Newtonian Mechanics, i.e. by
explaining exactly why it works when it does and why it doesn't work
under certain conditions.

Wittgenstein did not have the vocabulary to describe the underlying
processes which cause Alzheimer's disease or depression with any more
precission than he could muster in describing the processes which give
rise to bone marrow cancer or asthma. Ordinary language is great, but it
doesn't make all the distinctions necessary to satisfy our need to know
exectly how and why things work. You're going to have to introduce some
new and as-of-yet unknown distinctions, and you're going to have to use
some jargon.

Sorry if I sound like I'm jumping on your case. Thanks for sharing those
items with us.

Take care. -KMO