I found some of the points right on target, some other objectionable, but the scope of this essay is so wide and the issues are so clearly identified and stated that hundreds of hours of discussions could be based on it.
Here are some snips from the part dealing with the topic title of the essay. There is a reference to the evolutionary benefit of "psychological denial" and a suggestion that such an evolutionary trait can/should be countered by memetic means.
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In economic affairs, The Wealth of Nations (1776) popularized the "invisible hand," the idea that an individual who "intends only his own gain," is, as it were, "led by an invisible hand to promote…the public interest." Adam Smith did not assert that this was invariably true, and perhaps neither did any of his followers. But he contributed to a dominant tendency of thought that has ever since interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society.
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The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decisionmaking herdsman is only a fraction of -1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit -- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
Some would say that this is a platitude. Would that it were! In a sense, it was learned thousands of years ago, but natural selection favors the forces of psychological denial. The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers. Education can counteract the natural tendency to do the wrong thing, but the inexorable succession of generations requires that the basis for this knowledge be constantly refreshed.
Hmmm. The idea of the tragedy of the commons has been much debated and many problems identified with it (not least of which is the illiberal nature of some of Hardin's prescriptions, something Hayek had already discussed in another context: http://jim.com/hayek.htm). For example, Bjorn Lomborg argued that in many cases natural resources can be reasonably be described as being infinite, in which case the issue of a tragedy of the commons simply does not arise (though I think that idea is perhaps worthy of being more sceptical about).
The most well known example of these critiques is Elinor Ostrom in her book Governing the Commons:
Ostrom argued that problems of the kind Hardin described can be solved by alternative means than privatization or centralization, such as “polycentric” governance systems, in which central authorities provide broad enforcement, but let local communities set their own rules as much as possible. For example, problems of overfishing of lobsters along the Maine coast have been solved by allowing local lobster fishermen to informally regulate certain parts of the coast, working in conjunction with the state government.
[Kharin] Hmmm. The idea of the tragedy of the commons has been much debated and many problems identified with it (not least of which is the illiberal nature of some of Hardin's prescriptions, something Hayek had already discussed in another context: http://jim.com/hayek.htm).
[rhinoceros] What I found most interesting in Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" (http://dieoff.com/page95.htm) is how he laid down a number of clearly identified issues in a way that they can be discussed, accepted, or refuted. I already mentioned I have objections or reservations to several points he made.
I also have objections to Hayek's text (http://jim.com/hayek.htm). It is also interesting, but in a different way. It is built upon concepts such as planning, power, individualism, socialism, freedom, security, liberalism. democracy, totalitarianism etc, which are understood in different ways by readers of different background. For this reason, each one of us will probably find his strawmen in there (I already did). Hayek's text can be easily perceived as a polemic opinion piece.
[Kharin] For example, Bjorn Lomborg argued that in many cases natural resources can be reasonably be described as being infinite, in which case the issue of a tragedy of the commons simply does not arise (though I think that idea is perhaps worthy of being more sceptical about).
[rhinoceros] This is a good point to raise an objection to Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" scenario. Of course, natural resources are not really practically unlimited (although I am not sure which ones are the "many cases" Lomborg referred to and how significant they are). However, science and technology have been working on that. Just imagine unlimited energy... It could make this a "non zero sum" game so that we leave behind the "Tragedy of the Commons" is an open bet. Is this ever going to be practically possible? Here is another interesting discussion...
[Kharin] Ostrom argued that problems of the kind Hardin described can be solved by alternative means than privatization or centralization, such as “polycentric” governance systems, in which central authorities provide broad enforcement, but let local communities set their own rules as much as possible. For example, problems of overfishing of lobsters along the Maine coast have been solved by allowing local lobster fishermen to informally regulate certain parts of the coast, working in conjunction with the state government.
[rhinoceros] This seems reasonable, and I would vote for some kind of "complementarity principle" as well. But how exactly can such administrative measures address the problem of the commons? Hmm... is it about creating groups small enough to watch their members and to personally feel the consequences of the actions of others in their commons? A kind of defensive partial collectivization?
His catch line is "think society not economics" and illustrates the power of the market as a coordinating mechanism while highlighting certain market shortfalls.
Some of the freedom in market systems is illusory.
[Kharin]Ostrom argued that problems of the kind Hardin described can be solved by alternative means than privatization or centralization, such as “polycentric” governance systems, in which central authorities provide broad enforcement, but let local communities set their own rules as much as possible. For example, problems of overfishing of lobsters along the Maine coast have been solved by allowing local lobster fishermen to informally regulate certain parts of the coast, working in conjunction with the state government.
[rhinoceros] This seems reasonable, and I would vote for some kind of "complementarity principle" as well. But how exactly can such administrative measures address the problem of the commons? Hmm... is it about creating groups small enough to watch their members and to personally feel the consequences of the actions of others in their commons? A kind of defensive partial collectivization?
[Mermaid]The lobster conservation efforts in Maine along with the lobster fishermen is loosely based on Japan's Fisheries co-operative Associations. The idea itself is several hundreds of years old. Basically, the Fisheries co-operative Association owns all the fishing rights of the sea. The fishing grounds is *private* property and is no longer the "commons". There are many FCAs and fishing rights can be purchased by individual fishermen/company only if they belong to one of the several FCAs. The Japanese FCA model is nothing but conservation through privatisation because the ocean is considered as private property just as land is considered as private property that can be owned, sold, purchased, leased and utilised for productive purposes.
The Maine Lobster co-management is rather successful, but I am not sure it is the same as the Japanese FCA model as the ocean is still not the private property of any of these lobster fishermen. There is less structure and even less control for it to be accepted as a valid solution to the tragedy of the commons or lobster fishing grounds, in this case. Co-management instead of privatisation(as with Japanese FCAs) will probably have to deal with a lot more conflict as there is no clear cut idea as to the authority or ownership or even accountability. Here loosely formed fishermen groups co-operate and co-manage on issues such as setting a limit to the number of traps, how many traps a particular lobster fisherman can set in x number of months etc. The govt itself does not have any jurisdiction over the oceans or the fishing grounds. Its basically agreeing upon figures and limitations set by a group of people with the blessings of the govt. It might sound cynical, but its nothing more than the lobster industry protecting itself from outsiders. It still doesnt really tackle the tragedy of the commons scenario because there is still no "loss" in an economic sense for any individual lobster fisherman if he breaks any of the imposed rules. Take the Japanese FCA as an example...just as with ..say agricultural land... there is a definite monetary loss for the one who holds the ownership title if there is over use of the resouce...this loss translates into sensible limits on overusing a particular resource...so...privatisation helps to curtail the abuse of the oceans and hence prevents the tragedy of the commons.
"For this reason, each one of us will probably find his strawmen in there (I already did). Hayek's text can be easily perceived as a polemic opinion piece."
I don't think it can be seen as having predictive capability, for example, state control of industry in Britain and France was properly controlled through established democratic mechanisms. Said industries were not very efficient and were mostly privatised and the matter went no further than that. On the other hand, I don't think one needs to strain too hard to find cases where the Hayekian view had greater applicability; the present administration in Russia appears to view much enterprise as a challenge to state power. Of course, similar problems pertain to Hardin's other solution, privatisation, particularly in cases where there are not sufficient controls and safeguards (e.g. monopolies and mergers).
In this context, I was more concerned with observing that consolidation of control of resources into the hands of governments can have some rather obviously problematic implications. Hardin discussed population control, for example, where the only administration I can think of to enforce policies of that kind was that of the PRC.
Quote:
"Of course, natural resources are not really practically unlimited (although I am not sure which ones are the "many cases" Lomborg referred to and how significant they are). However, science and technology have been working on that. Just imagine unlimited energy... It could make this a "non zero sum" game so that we leave behind the "Tragedy of the Commons" is an open bet. "
"The question of sustainability of the world's energy resources has changed significantly. In the past, we worried about running out of oil. The continued use of fossil fuels was said to be unsustainable. Yet the fear turned out to be unfounded. Not only has the availability of oil, coal and natural gases increased dramatically throughout the past 100 years but we also leave the generations of tomorrow with many more sources (including renewable) of energy extraction.
Why? Because just as we have used more we have also improved our ability to find even more, to use it more efficiently and eventually to substitute it with other more efficient energy sources."
My suspicion with this is that it would certainly be legitimate to observe that usage of natural resoureces (whether oil, minerals or others) is probably much more efficient that is typically thought. I'm not sure I'd put it any more strongly though.
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