Is memetics a science?
« on: 2003-06-12 15:48:09 »
To continue our IRC chat here, I found a relevant post in memetics. Do you agree with Reed's criteria for what is a science? If so, how well does memetics fit the criteria?
>The mechanics of protein-formation are still not known, and it's not at all >clear that protein-formation, particularly at the quaternary level, is >forced into place by purely chemical and mechanical factors.
Biochemistry is based on the premise that macroscopic events as simple as crystallization and as complex as embryonic development are a result of microscopic structure. It is a mechanistic way of viewing the world.
A scientific theory requires several things. This is more or less in order from primary to peripheral
Mechanism: A theory must relate causes and effects.
Elegance: A theory must be understandable and teachable.
Significance: Theories are only created to understand important things. There is an opportunity cost associated with unlearning the intuitive and learning the foreign. If the benefit doesn't outweigh this cost, a new theory will not be adopted.
Empirical Falsifiable: A theory must engender experiments or directed observations. This isn't so much to confirm or refute the theory itself (despite arguments, no single experiment has ever lead a person to chuck an otherwise useful theory). Rather, falsifiable experiments allow a theory to be developed and refined. Without empirical restriction a theory will either remain amorphous or develop in an idiosyncratic way unlikely to be useful.
Fecundity: A theory must lead to more specific questions and hypotheses. The more researchers and students that believe there is a niche for their work under the umbrella of the theory, the more will adopt it. Offer a place at the table, and they will come.
Application: A theory that doesn't do something for the community at large will struggle and wither as resources are directed towards more useful endeavors. Actually, application often comes first: something useful is discovered by accident (like an antibiotic) and then scientists work to understand it.
Truth is not a factor. Exactly how a protein folds...indeed, if they even exist at all...isn't relevant. The question is: if we believe and act on that theory, what are the consequences? The explosion of biochemistry and biotechnology is a result of the fact that I can teach the basics of the theory in high school, thousands of people can find work within the field, and insulin can be manufactured cheaply in massive quantities.
Proteins might not fold according to a "mechanical" mechanism. But, it's pointless to argue that they fold according to no mechanism at all.
Which theory is most useful, of all that have ever been proposed? I would argue, at present, it is the biochemical model.
Best,
Reed
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Re:Is memetics a science?
« Reply #1 on: 2003-06-26 18:27:52 »
Assuming Reed's definition of science as valid, this suggests that memetics would indeed be a science. The application of memetics is probably the weakest point though.
Re:Is memetics a science?
« Reply #2 on: 2003-06-26 22:12:18 »
[David Lucifer] To continue our IRC chat here, I found a relevant post in memetics. Do you agree with Reed's criteria for what is a science? If so, how well does memetics fit the criteria?
<quote> A scientific theory requires several things. This is more or less in order from primary to peripheral
Mechanism: A theory must relate causes and effects. <snip>
[rhinoceros] If this is what mechanism means, then yes. It can even be a "black box" model with no gears or wheels. Can memetics correlate specific causes with a specific effect?
<quote> Elegance: A theory must be understandable and teachable. <snip>
[rhinoceros] Understandable is a reasonable requirement. Teachable... if it means that it can be communicated in an objective way, rather than resorting to claims of subjective experiences, then yes.
But I wonder why this entry was labeled "elegant". I do like elegance. I tend to associate it with "mathematical beauty," that is, simplicity of the premises and straightforward reasoning without exceptions and ad hoc assertions. Memetics does have simple premises, but I am not sure about the rest.
<quote> Significance: Theories are only created to understand important things. There is an opportunity cost associated with unlearning the intuitive and learning the foreign. If the benefit doesn't outweigh this cost, a new theory will not be adopted. <snip>
[rhinoceros] I would agree, except the first sentence. It is not the "things" which should be importan. It is the theory which must be worth the trouble. The theory should offer an advantage.
<quote> Empirical Falsifiable: A theory must engender experiments or directed observations. This isn't so much to confirm or refute the theory itself (despite arguments, no single experiment has ever lead a person to chuck an otherwise useful theory). Rather, falsifiable experiments allow a theory to be developed and refined. Without empirical restriction a theory will either remain amorphous or develop in an idiosyncratic way unlikely to be useful. <snip>
[rhinoceros] That would be great. It would even make memetics a "hard science."
<quote> Fecundity: A theory must lead to more specific questions and hypotheses. The more researchers and students that believe there is a niche for their work under the umbrella of the theory, the more will adopt it. Offer a place at the table, and they will come. <snip>
[rhinoceros] An interdisciplinary science! More than I would ever ask! But it is not a requirement, and the downside is that it is already being done without having taken care of the scientific requirements.
<quote> Application: A theory that doesn't do something for the community at large will struggle and wither as resources are directed towards more useful endeavors. Actually, application often comes first: something useful is discovered by accident (like an antibiotic) and then scientists work to understand it. <snip>
[rhinoceros] Amen. Can memetics provide anything better than the techniques already known to the media and public-relations folks?
<quote> Truth is not a factor. Exactly how a protein folds...indeed, if they even exist at all...isn't relevant. The question is: if we believe and act on that theory, what are the consequences? The explosion of biochemistry and biotechnology is a result of the fact that I can teach the basics of the theory in high school, thousands of people can find work within the field, and insulin can be manufactured cheaply in massive quantities. <snip>
[rhinoceros] "Truth is not a factor?" Strange way to put it. Usually, when carrying over the concept of truth from mathematics and logic to the modelled phenomena we say that truth is tentative, as a safety valve to account for replacing the model with a better one later on.
I guess if a theory involving proteins worked nicely, and someone with a microscope observed that proteins did not really exist, then the theory would still stay in place, with the understanding that proteins were imaginary conceptual entities. That would be ok.
Memes don't have to be material entities, however, the theory itself should have a claim to the truth.
Re:Is memetics a science?
« Reply #3 on: 2003-06-27 02:03:29 »
While following this line of thought, I came across this fascinating article, Is Psychology a Science? Paul Lutus, 2003. I think that he raises many valid issues in this article. I would suggest that the widespread acceptance of Psychology as a "science" points to the answer to the question, "is memetics a science?" Those who accept psychology as a "science" will probably also accept memetics as a "science". Those who assert that to be called a "science", the discipline in question must insist upon the rigorous application of the scientific method, probably will not.
This naturally raises the question of why some people label unscientific things as being scientific. And the answer to that may be that few people comprehend the rational of the scientific method, while most recognize (or at least have experienced) its benefits, so that the label, "scientific" has acquired the status of giving respectability to the the fields to which it is applied. For this reason, those more interested in legitimizing their brainstorms than validating them, and those attempting to defend their brainstorms from legitimate scientific enquiry, are often quick to label them as being "scientific", perhaps in the hope of providing a spurious air of respectability, rather as "by appointment to his majesty" was used in earlier times. Unfortunately it is somewhat easier to repudiate a pseudo supplier than a pseudo scientist, there being only a few monarchs at a time, and monarchs being easily identified as being heads of state, so one can ask, and receive an answer, about the veracity of such claims.
Even so, along the same lines, a good question is, "is this thing acknowledged by recognised scientists?" At this stage, as far as memetics is concerned, the answer has to be "no". Hard scientists look for repeatable, quantifiable results. Those calling memetics a science tend to be clustered in the "soft sciences" of sociology, psychology and so forth. And as the referenced article indicates, there is some quite legitimate doubt as to whether we should call such practioners "scientists" at all. After all, a "scientist" is undoubtedly somebody who applies the scientific method to their work. And ideas, no matter how labelled, tend to be quite elusive, far from repeatable, and although perhaps quantifiable, every hopeful memetic practitioner appears to have his own method of quantification. In these circumstances, the scientific method, seeking consensus, finds only noise. I suggest that this observation may be validated through an examination of the closest thing to a consensus currently possessed by memeticists (and their fellow travellers including sundry snake-oil peddlers), the "memetics list", associated with the "Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission", where the noise to signal ratio greatly exceeds that normally associated with scientific endeavours.
With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
In my mind, memetics is presently more of a perspective, doctrine, or theory, in other words, a philosophy, than it is a science. Particular applications of this theory, such as double-blind experiments to discover, say, whether the more simple falsehood or the more complex truth is more readily accepted by others, may qualify as scientific investigations. But science has to do with the subsumptions of a restricted class of particulars to a common structure, whereas philosophy proposes general models that are supposedly applicable universally, to unobserved as well as observed phenomena, as a matter of logical principle. Thus, the 'soft' sciences, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science and economics, are rarely strictly scientific in the same sense that, say, physics and chemistry may claim to be. However, this fact does not invalidate the memetic stance, any more than it invalidates the stances of phenomenology, genetic epistemology, semiotics or hermeneutics. In fact, theory, while not in itself science, is indispensable to scientific inquiry. A case in point is the relation between cognitive philosophy and cognitive science. Cognitive philosophy encompasses such perspectives as the gestaltist stance, the associationist stance, the connectionist stance, etc. These stances are basically investigation engines, that is, they correlate and structure the data which cognitive science supplies, then propose logical entailments or possibilities, that is, other things that must or might be true if the correlations and structurations into which these systems fit the data are indeed correct. The consequences of these further suppositions are then cast into testable hypotheses upon which experiments are conducted, and the data are fed back into the models, where they enrich, elaborate, extrapolate and refine further developments of the stances/theories. What we have going on here is a dialectic, but not a Hegelian one, where a thesis and an antithesis are subsumed as special cases by an encompassing synthesis. Rather, we have a continuously evolving and mutually informing bouncing between theory and practice, or, in other words, an evolving praxis. Feedback from experiment winnow out some theoretical possibilities, while suggesting others; theoretical innovations/advances suggest areas where novel experiments might reveal new scientific knowledge. The two nurture each other. In fact, the philosophical stances I mentioned before are themselves interrelated in a broader overarching structure. Phenomenology and genetic epistemology are both stances addressing the realm of being, rather than the realm of meaning. Phenomenology is the introspective (from within the consciousness of the investigator) study of the invariant perceptual and conceptual structures which are congealed in the matured, that is, the self-and-other-consciously aware, mind, while genetic epistemology is an extrospective (from the data collected from questioned and observed others) study of the functional paths by which mind evolves and develops into self-and-other-conscious awareness. The same relationship obtains, in the realm of meaning rather than that of being, between semiotics and memetics; semiotics studies the structure of meaning-relation, that is the triadic relation between self, observed and symbol, whereas memetics addresses the inculcation of this symbolic relationship in the developing mind. Although our perceptual apparati provisionally reach an end-state where things like causality, conservation and completion are internalized and provide a template within which mind and world can relate in the realm of being through the dialectic of perception and action, we forever are developing and evolving new meanings by which we interpret and categorize our experiences of being, as well as discarding obscelescent ones. Presence is the ur-meaning as well as the ur-being; hermeneutics held that meaning was prior to being and existentialism held that being was prior to meaning, but it is now known that, for the self-and-other-conscious awareness, whose self-identity and self-existence in the face of the other its (things) and thous (people), (a self-existence and self-identity which itself was purposefully developed via engagement with responsive others (parents and caretakers)), that being and meaning are co-primordial. Thus memetics takes its rightful place in a larger structure that includes semiotics, genetic epistemology and phenomenology, a structure which itself is informed by the co-primordiality if existence and interpretation.