[Joe Dees] Nukes are not toys. Unstable and murderous despots attempting to acquire them, and coming frigging close, is no joke. And petty piffling political posturing in the face of such a dire threat is exceeedingly unwise. We're not fucking playing here; it is extremely serious, and the ramifications will decisively and personally affect all of us. We have to do what we have to do to avoid such massively devastating and catastrophic consequences, and equivocating and
hair-splitting exercises in trendy but suicidal futility be damned. The Bush administration was handed much by the Clintin administration concerning the al Quaeda threat; a Clinton administration failed to act because they feared that a (perceived) October surprise attack against Bin Laden woud be interpreted as their attempting to influence the course of the 2000 election in Al Gore's favor by engaging in pre-election military action; the Bush administration failed to act becaus they did not want to be seen as implementing an already formulated Clinton plan. The result? 3000 dead, and a smoking hole in the heart of New York City (check out the August 12 issue of time magazine). The threat with which we are presently faced is FAR more serious. We simply cannot allow politics to permit a nuclear version of 9/11. That alternative is globally unacceptable - and personally disastrous.
[Hermit]
I don't know about anyone else, but I'm tired of Joe's yammering and regurgitation of Whitehouse propaganda and jingoism without bothering to do any reseach for himself. Perhaps he is correct, and we should bomb Washington, Jerusalem, New Delhi, Islamabad, Peking and P'yongyang. But his slippery slope wannabe arguments fail for Iraq. Here is why. Courtesy of FAS, it is worth noting:
The UN Special Commission, UNSCOM, claimed to have succeeded in eliminating much of Iraq's nuclear, ballistic missile, and chemical weapons capabilities by 1998. Baghdad's uranium enrichment and other nuclear production facilities were identified and destroyed early in the inspection program. According to an UNSCOM report in 1997, "There are no indications that any weapon-usable nuclear materials remain in Iraq" and no "evidence in Iraq of prohibited materials, equipment, or activities."
Iraq's ballistic missiles, bar two, have not only been eliminated, they have been accounted for. "Of the 819 Scud missiles provided to Iraq before the Gulf War, UNSCOM has accounted for 817."
Most of Iraq's chemical weapons capability was located and destroyed. "Considerable quantities of chemical weapons, their components, and chemical weapons-related equipment have been destroyed," UNSCOM reports (Letter From Executive Chairman of Special Commission, S/1997/922, p. 4.)
UNSCOM investigators destroyed thousands of liters of botulinum, anthrax, and other germ warfare agents. Most of this was originally sourced from the US and extended using French and German expertise.
To cite from what is probably the most authoritive public source souce, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, at http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2000/nd00/nd00cortright.html:
The implications of UNSCOM's demise are disturbing, but they are not as dire as Butler suggests. The lesson of the UNSCOM experience is not that disarmament is impossible, but that it is unlikely to be achieved solely through coercive and punitive means. The fault in Iraq was not with the process of disarmament but with the politics of the Security Council, which was held hostage by the United States. Washington refused to acknowledge that the commission was making progress and it was unwilling to reciprocate on those occasions when Iraq conceded to U.N. demands. The United States showed by its actions that it was more interested in containing Iraq militarily than it was in an effective U.N.-administered disarmament process.
UNSCOM and its partner agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), made a great deal of progress in the "destruction, removal, or rendering harmless" of Iraq's nuclear, ballistic missile, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Although Iraq repeatedly tried to deceive and disrupt U.N. weapons inspections, UNSCOM nonetheless succeeded over the years in locating and dismantling much of Iraq's weapons capability.
In 1998 the IAEA could certify that "Iraq has satisfactorily completed . . . its full final and complete declaration of its clandestine nuclear program." UNSCOM likewise reported that "there are no indications that any weapons-usable nuclear materials remain in Iraq" and "no evidence in Iraq of prohibited materials, equipment, or activities." Although concerns remain about gaps in the information Baghdad provided and weapons components that remain unaccounted for, most observers agree that the Iraqi nuclear threat has been effectively neutralized.
Iraq's ballistic missile programs were also largely eliminated. According to UNSCOM reports, efforts to inspect and dismantle missile capabilities yielded "significant results." All but two of the 819 Scud missiles known to have existed at the start of the Gulf War were accounted for, and no evidence was uncovered of any successful indigenous development or testing of prohibited long-range missiles.
Much of Iraq's chemical weapons capability was located and destroyed as well. UNSCOM reported "significant progress" in this area, and it was able to close and dismantle Iraq's prime chemical weapons development and production complex.
Scott Ritter, one of Butler's lead inspectors and author of his own book on the experience, Endgame, concluded in a June 2000 article in Arms Control Today that as of 1997 "Iraq had been disarmed." According to Ritter, Iraq "no longer possessed any meaningful quantities of chemical or biological agent . . . and the industrial means to produce these agents had either been eliminated or were subject to stringent monitoring. The same was true of Iraq's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities."
...
Butler told Russian officials in Moscow in December 1998 that the final accounting of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could be completed within six to eight weeks if Iraq cooperated. While major uncertainties remained in the area of biological weapons (which is inevitable given the dual-use character of many biological agents and equipment), by 1998 the job of disarming Iraq was nearly complete.
***
It is difficult to understand why unscom, in light of the progress it had made in the biological area, continued to push aggressively at the margins in an unrealistic effort to achieve final, certifiably complete disarmament. The unrelenting and increasingly hostile pursuit of this objective yielded steadily diminishing returns--both politically and in terms of actual disarmament. It also led to the erosion of political support for UNSCOM's mission and a splintering of the international coalition arrayed against Saddam Hussein.
Russia, France, and other Security Council members began to press for the completion of the commission's work and the lifting of sanctions. Sergey Lavrov, Russia's U.N. ambassador, called for closing the files in areas like nuclear weapons, with a consequent easing of some of the sanctions measures. The idea was to match the completion of various disarmament tasks to the gradual lifting of sanctions as a way of encouraging Iraqi cooperation.
France called for maintaining a vigorous arms embargo but lifting all civilian trade sanctions. The main objective, Paris argued, should be to end the confrontation with Iraq in a way that provided reasonable assurances against the development of weapons of mass destruction while encouraging the normalization of political relations. Under the French proposal, U.N. Inspectors would give up the increasingly frustrating and fruitless pursuit of weapons verification inside Iraq and concentrate instead on monitoring Iraq's borders and transit points to prevent the import of weapons or military-related technology. Better to continue some form of arms monitoring without sanctions, French officials argued, than to continue sanctions without inspections.
The United States adamantly refused to consider any easing of pressure on Iraq, however, and the worst fears of the French were confirmed. UNSCOM was ejected and inspections came to a halt but the sanctions remained in place. The United Nations lost its ability to monitor Saddam Hussein's weapons programs, yet the suffering of the Iraqi civilian population continued.
Throughout the U.N.'s decade-long confrontation with Iraq, Washington has maintained a relentlessly punitive and militarized policy. It has threatened or used military force frequently, including the intensive air attacks of December 1998. In the last two years, Washington has conducted regular bombing raids. Its aim is not to enforce the Gulf War cease-fire resolution and achieve Iraqi disarmament, but to remove Saddam Hussein from power--a policy President Clinton made clear in November 1997 when he declared that "sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as long as [Saddam Hussein] lasts." Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made a similar point in a March 1997 speech at Georgetown University, asserting that the United States disagreed with the Gulf War cease-fire provision stipulating that sanctions would be lifted when Iraq complied with U.N. Weapons inspections.
Given these realities, Iraq had no incentive to make concessions or to cooperate with inspectors. With no hope or expectation of reaching a political agreement, Baghdad relied instead on familiar strategies of obstruction and resistance, attempting to wear down U.N. resolve and widen the growing political differences within the Security Council.
[hr]
Now notice the reliance on two people in all of Joe's putative arguments - irrespective of the Journal, Newspaper or other source.
One, Richard Butler, CIA agent, Mossad sympathiser, and US plant on the UNSCOM team. The same person as asserted that there was "incontrovertable evidence" that Iraq was behind the Anthrax attacks in the US. Two, Khidhir Hamza, a Shiite, a former Iraqi nuclear scientist and a "world class liar" - who defected to the U.S. in 1994.
Let's deal with them in turn.
First Butler. Look back at the news from 1998-99. Here is a reminder for you.
1. Saddam Hussein says UNSCOM contains CIA and Mossad spies. Which it did.
2. UNSCOM’S Richard Butler says he is doing his job impartially.
3. Saddam Hussein kicks out UNSCOM. Nobody believes him that UNSCOM are spies.
4. UNSCOM Inspector Scott Ritter tells everybody that Richard Butler is a liar.
5. Richard Butler tells everybody that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.
6. Saddam Hussein says he hasn’t.
7. Richard Butler says he wants to go back to inspect.
8. Saddam says no, not unless the inspectors are not CIA spies.
9. The USA sets a deadline for Iraq to let in inspectors.
10. The deadline passes and the US starts bombing Iraq to make him let Richard Butler back in.
11. (Several months later) It is revealed in an inquiry that Richard Butler’s UNSCOM was riddled with CIA and Mossad spies.
Now what is Richard Butler saying? "Give Iraq one last chance" to let inspectors in - and if he does not, then attack. But this is the identical strategy to that which he employed in 1998. Which lead to what the European press refered to as "The Second Gulf War." Of course, the US didn't really bother to report on it - after all, they only dropped more bombs (conventional - from 30'000 feet) than they had in the first Gulf War.
Now Khidhir Hamza. Let's try to figure out what position he held. In October 2001, Hamza participated in an online chat for CNN. Following are excerpts:
CHAT PARTICIPANT: If America could just do one thing in Iraq, what would you like see happen?
HAMZA: I would like to see the Iraqi opposition better trained, some two or three thousand persons, trained and sent back into south Iraq, and supported by U.S. Air Force, no U.S. troops, just Air Force, doing what it is doing now, but a little more intensely. By watching Saddam's troop movement and making them stay in their box, is all that's required right now. Just send the Iraqi opposition trained militia, and support them there. That's the only thing we need now. That's the official position right now of the Iraqi opposition, they want to be supported this way, with some resources provided, say food and some equipment. Minimal cost opposition. Much less than is being done in Afghanistan right now, for instance. This way, the U.S. would eliminate the major terrorist government in the Middle East right now, probably the world."
Did you notice the "we" above? Ok, so we know where he is coming from - an Iraq opposition position. But according to the CIA, the Iraqi opposition is known for manipulating, lying, distorting and fabricating defections and news coming out of Iraq to garner support for an attack on Iraq. As is Mossad. And, we should mention, the CIA. But we are looking at Hamza. So let's look harder. In 1999, David Albright and Kevin O'Neill published a report for the Institute for Science and International Security titled "Iraq's Efforts to Acquire Information about Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Related Technologies from the United States". In the report, Hamza is listed as "a senior Iraqi nuclear scientist who held several high-level positions in Iraq's pre-Gulf War nuclear weapons program". Question is why did the very institute where Hamza worked not list him as head or director of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program? Does this distinction not carry a weight of its own?
There have been widespread allegations that Hamza was little more than a mid-level physicist in Iraq. According to the Center for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS) and the CNS Monitoring Proliferation Threats Nuclear Abstract Database Hamza was definitely not the head of Iraq's Nuclear weapons program. From an article available on that database; "documents were faxed to the Times' offices from Greece by a person claiming to be acting on behalf of Dr. Khidhir Abdul Abas Hamza, a physicist known to have worked on electromagnetic enrichment of uranium (EMIS) for Iraq's nuclear weapons program, PC-3." (Nuclear Fuel, 4/24/95, p. 16, by Mark Hibbs).
The article goes on to state "the IAEA confirmed that Hamza worked in Iraq's nuclear program, and the Sunday Times located an article published in the 2/79 issue of Nuovo Cimento, a scientific journal, by "K A A Hamza of the Nuclear Research Centre, Tawattha [Tuwaitha], Baghdad".
However, according to Hamza's own CV (available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/cvhamza.htmlEarlier in October 2001, Hamza participated in an online chat for CNN. Following are excerpts:
"CHAT PARTICIPANT: If America could just do one thing in Iraq, what would you like see happen?
HAMZA: I would like to see the Iraqi opposition better trained, some two or three thousand persons, trained and sent back into south Iraq, and supported by U.S. Air Force, no U.S. troops, just Air Force, doing what it is doing now, but a little more intensely. By watching Saddam's troop movement and making them stay in their box, is all that's required right now. Just send the Iraqi opposition trained militia, and support them there. That's the only thing we need now. That's the official position right now of the Iraqi opposition, they want to be supported this way, with some resources provided, say food and some equipment. Minimal cost opposition. Much less than is being done in Afghanistan right now, for instance. This way, the U.S. would eliminate the major terrorist government in the Middle East right now, probably the world."
The above statement from Hamza is ominously identical to positions expressed by former CIA Chief Woolsley, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, and other hawks calling for Iraq's regime change.
The above also leaves open the question of Hamza's reliability. In claiming the official position of the Iraqi opposition, Hamza comes of sounding like their spokesperson. Consequently, all his opinions are skewed and biased. According to the CIA itself, the Iraqi opposition is known for manipulating, lying, distorting and fabricating defections and news coming out of Iraq to garner support for an attack on Iraq.
What also sticks out like a sore thumb is Hamza's own CV. Did he really head Iraq's nuclear weapons program? In 1999, David Albright and Kevin O'Neill published a report for the Institute for Science and International Security titled "Iraq's Efforts to Acquire Information about Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Related Technologies from the United States". In the report, Hamza is listed as "a senior Iraqi nuclear scientist who held several high-level positions in Iraq's pre-Gulf War nuclear weapons program". Question is why did the very institute where Hamza worked not list him as head or director of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program? Does this distinction not carry a weight of its own?
There have been widespread allegations that Hamza was little more than a mid-level physicist in Iraq. According to the Center for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS) and the CNS Monitoring Proliferation Threats Nuclear Abstract Database Hamza was definitely not the head of Iraq's Nuclear weapons program. From an article available on that database; "documents were faxed to the Times' offices from Greece by a person claiming to be acting on behalf of Dr. Khidhir Abdul Abas Hamza, a physicist known to have worked on electromagnetic enrichment of uranium (EMIS) for Iraq's nuclear weapons program, PC-3." (Nuclear Fuel, 4/24/95, p. 16, by Mark Hibbs).
The article goes on to state "the IAEA confirmed that Hamza worked in Iraq's nuclear program, and the Sunday Times located an article published in the 2/79 issue of Nuovo Cimento, a scientific journal, by "K A A Hamza of the Nuclear Research Centre, Tawattha [Tuwaitha], Baghdad".
However, according to Hamza's own CV (available at [url]http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/cvhamza.html) Hamza was not a part of the Nuclear Research Centre at Tuwaitha in 1979. Hamza was Head of the Fuel Division, Theoretical Section at the Iraqi Atomic Agency between 1975 and 1980. In the Publications section of the CV, no mention is made of the above article in Nuovo Cimento. Isn't it peculiar that the IAEA, a highly regarded nuclear watchdog among other things, did not recognize that Hamza was head of Iraq's nuclear program but rather as someone who worked in the program? Would the IAEA never have met the man during its course of work in Iraq? The answer may lie in Hamza's own bungling. By his own admission in the September/October 1998 issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: "Over the years, I had many roles. I was chief of the fuel division in the 1970s, head of the theoretical division of the enrichment program in the 1980s, scientific adviser to the chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission (IAEC) in the mid-1980s, and--for a brief period in 1987--director of weaponization." ( http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1998/so98/so98hamza.html)
"For a brief period". A brief period in 1987 and yet the man is touted as the brilliant head of Iraq's nuclear program. Of course it was a brief period because in 1988, Hamza took charge of Theory and Modeling of the Dense Plasma Focus (DPF) Project and Manager in charge of the Iraqi delegation to Poland. Following that, he became a Junior Lecturer at the University of Bagdad.
Would you hire this man as a junior research assistant. I know I wouldn't. Neither would anyone at the FAS. We don't believe him, and look askance at anyone who would. And if we cannot trust him enough to hire him, why the hell should we believe him sufficiently to kill large numbers of people on his unsupported assertion.
Oh - but the bomb, you squeal. That is not good enough. Look at the source above. Now consider his claims about "the bomb."
In January 1999, Hamza addressed the Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace Non-Proliferation Project - January 11-12, 1999; Washington, D.C.): "The plans were made and designed for an eventual production of 100 kilogram bomb -- six bombs. That would be a reasonable arsenal in something like five to 10 years. So in a decade or so, Iraq would become a real nuclear power like Israel."
In December 2001 U.S. News interviewed Hamza. "Hamza and his colleagues had 31 kilograms of uranium from their Osiraq reactor that had been destroyed by Israeli bombers in 1981, from which they could distill 18 kilograms enriched enough to form the core. But they also knew that any such move would set off alarms at the International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitored Iraq's use of uranium, and that Iraq would be stopped from developing any more enriched uranium. Thus, Iraq would be able to build only one oversize bomb. Informed of this, Hamza says, Saddam agreed to shift to concentrating on using chemical and biological weaponry to halt the allied forces of Desert Storm... Even worse, he says, he is certain that Saddam Hussein has been rebuilding Iraq's chemical and biological programs-a task far easier than reconstituting the nuclear program."
So just one bomb and a focus on Biochem.
Then in July 2002 Hamza testified to the U.S. Senate panel investigating Iraq's nuclear armaments. Hamza told U.S. Senators that Iraq was "three years away from creating up to three atomic bombs". "Containment would not work with Iraq", Hamza claimed and strongly advocated "regime change".
So now three bombs and three years. From a man who was last in Iraq in 1994. And whom Scott Ritter - and the FAS - have branded a world class liar.
Does it seem that his story is more than a little uneven? But he does make a lot of money as Mr Hussein's bomb maker. Not the least part of it paid by the US government. Still, it wouldn't convince me to kill a single person. Never mind, as seems likely, hundreds of thousands. But then, I probably don't watch enough CNN.
Seeing as Joe is quoting The Times these days (and the Guardian's international coverage and spread of reporters is vastly superior to that of "The Thunderer"), if he had read "virus: Secret files on Baghdad's weapons plans by Michael Evans" which he posted to the CoV, he would know that no reputable source contends that Iraq has nuclear weapons or a near term capability to develop them. There are many "Unstable and murderous despots" who already have access to nuclear capabilities. One of them being the unelected Dubya - and his collection of Raeganite cronies who appear determined to get their hands on Iraq's oil, no matter what this leads to.
Meanwhile the price of crude has doubled on the rumors of war just as winter comes in... and US marines are being shipped off just in time to drum up some war sympathy for the Republican push for votes in the coming elections.
And a year after 911, and Joe Dees is still displaying all the symptoms of his Compulsive Personality Disorder all over the list. Yes, "Tired of This" is an appropriate subject line.
---- This message was posted by Hermit to the Virus 2002 board on Church of Virus BBS. <http://virus.lucifer.com/bbs/index.php?board=51;action=display;threadid=26296>
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