Some subjects should be approached with fear and trembling. One
such subject concerns nuclear war in the Middle East. Because the
creation of a state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel would
heighten this prospect considerably, ongoing developments in that
unfortunate region should be viewed with a special kind of
apprehension.
Architects of the Oslo Agreements suggest, of course, that a "two-
state solution" to the Palestinian problem would substantially
reduce the risk of another major war in the Middle East. After all,
we are told, even after the defeat of Saddam Hussein, this problem
is the festering sore that gives rise to all other rivalries. Once we
have "justice" for the Palestinians, the Arab governments and Iran
will begin to create area-wide harmony and comprehensive peace
settlements could be negotiated readily from the Mediterranean
and Red Seas to the Persian Gulf.
But as we should have learned from the 1991 Gulf War, and the
recent experience of the Rabin/Peres governments, the
conventional Oslo wisdom is unwise! For the most part, Iranian
and Arab state inclinations to war have nothing to do with the
Palestinians. Even if the Netanyahu government were to continue
with Oslo concessions, these inclinations would continue,
especially from Syria and Libya as well as Iran. Indeed, if Israel
were to coexist with a new state of Palestine, the Jewish state's
vulnerability to armed attack by hostile neighbors would increase
markedly. And if this diminished safety were accompanied by the
spread of unconventional weapons to hostile states, which now
seems plausible, Israel could find itself confronting not only war,
but genocide.
Why? Most importantly, a new state of Palestine would preoccupy
Israeli military forces to a much greater extent than did the
intifada. Even if it were able to resist takeover by one of the other
Islamic states in the region, a takeover accomplished either
directly or by insurgent surrogates, Palestine would inevitably
become a favored launching-point for renewed terrorism against
Israel. Various promises notwithstanding, Islamic insurgents
would continue to celebrate violence against Israel as the essence
of "national liberation."
Recognizing an "improved" configuration of forces vis-a-vis
Israel, a larger number of enemy states would calculate that they
now confront a smaller, more beleaguered adversary. And they
would understand that a coordinated effort by certain countries
that possess or are in the process of acquiring ballistic missiles
capable of striking Israel could possibly endanger Israel's very
survival. Taken together with the fact that global support for Israel
is always fickle, and that individual or combined
chemical/biological warfare capabilities could bring enormous
harm to Israel, the creation of Palestine could tip the balance of
power in the Middle East decisively.
In considering the costs and benefits of a Palestinian state vis-a-
vis other possible remedies, the full strategic implications for
Israel of an independent Palestine should be carefully appraised.
If, in the end, such independence became the cause of a nuclear
war in the region, everyone, Palestinians as well as Jews, would
lose.
But how, exactly, would a nuclear war begin in a reconfigured
Middle East? One possibility suggested by the Iraqi Scud attacks
in 1991 would be by Arab or Iranian first strikes against Israel.
These strikes could be nuclear (although this would be at least
several years away, as nuclear warheads and bombs are not yet
available) or nonnuclear. In either scenario, Israel--especially if it
feels perilously close to defeat---might resort to nuclear
retaliation.
Alternatively, Israel, believing that substantial enemy attack--
chemical, biological, conventional, or nuclear--is imminent, could
decide to preempt. If, as we might expect, this preemption were
entirely nonnuclear, it could still fail to prevent the anticipated
attack against Israel. Here, Israeli nuclear weapons, having failed
in their mission to support conventional preemption by deterring
enemy retaliation, might also have to be used for purposes of
nuclear warfighting. Israel has much to fear. Facing a growing
number of adversaries with ballistic missiles and with an interest
in nuclear warheads, Jerusalem knows that transformation of
Judea/Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza into Palestine could provide
its enemies with the means and the incentives to destroy the
Jewish State once and for all. Deprived of essential "strategic
depth," Israel could become seriously vulnerable to total defeat.
Anguished by a possible end to the Third Temple, the nation's
leaders would begin to think seriously about nuclear weapons as a
last resort (the so-called "Samson Option"). It follows that
however disturbing and problematic Israel's control of the
remaining territories may be, the still likely alternative of
Palestinian independence must be worked out with extraordinary
care. Otherwise, Palestine, looking first very much like Lebanon,
could wind up as Armageddon, a metamorphosis that would favor
neither Israeli nor Palestinian.
====================
LOUIS RENE BERES (Ph.D. Princeton) is Professor of Political
Science and International Law at Purdue University and is the
author of SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S
NUCLEAR STRATEGY (Lexington Books, 1986) and many
other major books on nuclear weapons and nuclear war
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