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{PRIVATE}University of Nebraska at Omaha
                 {PRIVATE}Afghanistan Atlas Project
Where did the Taliban come from?
The first devotees came from the poverty-stricken refugee camps 
that sprung up along the Pakistani border during the Afghan-
Soviet war. The young men of these camps learned a fierce and 
fundamental strain of Islam through the madrassas, Islamic 
schools that dotted the Afghan-Pakistani border. In September 
1994, Mohammad Omar, then a mullah and today the leader of 
the Taliban, created the militia in the southern Afghan province of 
Kandahar. From the start, its goal was to unite a divided and war-
plagued Afghanistan under a strict and unyielding version of 
Sharia -- Islamic law as written in the Koran, the life of 
Mohammed and his followers, and Muslim scholars through the 
ages.
Initial victories
The Taliban's growing power in Kandahar attracted the attention 
of the Pakistani government, which hired the Taliban in 
November 1994 to protect convoys traveling between Pakistan 
and Central Asia. Taliban successes against local warlords 
attracted more followers and emboldened the Taliban to take 
control of Jalalabad, the eastern city bordering Pakistan on Sept. 
11, 1996. Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, was occupied by the 
Taliban on Sept. 27, 1996.
Support
Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the mujahedeen -- 
Islamic warriors -- once united against the Soviets, divided along 
ethnic and regional lines.
During this civil war, the Taliban promised an end to the 
corruption and chaos plaguing much of the country. That young 
men followed, to the word, the teachings of mullahs was neither 
unusual nor radical within the context of Afghanistan's history. 
Since the Anglo-Afghanistan wars of the 19th century, religious 
leaders have played a major role in galvanizing opposition.
The Taliban gained the support of both disaffected mujahedeen as 
well more recent graduates from the madrassas. Ethnic allegiance 
also secured Taliban membership. Most of its members are 
Pashtun, the majority ethnic group that ruled Afghanistan for 2 1/2 
centuries but lost power following the Soviet occupation. The 
Taliban's popularity and predominant military might gave it a 
tentative legitimacy to rule the country, and by June 1997 the 
militia controlled two-thirds of the country.
Building an Islamic State
After seizing control, the Taliban instituted strict enforcement of 
Sharia, Islamic religious law. Modern conveniences such as 
computers, televisions, movies and radios were banned under the 
pretext that they diverted minds from the tenets of Islam. Any 
depiction of living things, including photography, paintings and 
sculpture was banned. Men were required to wear beards at least a 
fist-length below the chin. Women and girls were banned from 
schools and the workplace and ordered to wear burqas, a one-
piece gown with a built-in mesh screen from which to see and 
breathe. Enforcement for breaking Taliban law is meted out by 
the Department for Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice. 
Infractions such as improper beard lengths may merit a public 
beating. More serious crimes such as theft or blasphemy could 
result in an amputation or execution.
Global recognition
Despite armed resistance from warlords in the countryside, the 
Taliban has managed to gain control of 90 percent of the country. 
The assassination of Ahmed Shah Masood on Sept. 15, 2001, may 
help the Taliban take control of the far north, Afghanistan's last 
anti-Taliban stronghold. Nevertheless, the Taliban's dominance 
has earned it little outside recognition. U.N. sanctions were 
imposed in 1999 and increased in 2001 in hopes of forcing the 
Taliban to hand over bin Laden. Only two countries -- Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia -- officially recognize the Taliban. The United 
Arab Emirates withdrew its recognition some two weeks after the 
attacks.
Challenges
War and its aftermath have laid waste to Afghanistan. Cities lack 
potable water and sanitation facilities. According to the United 
Nations, there are between 9 million and 10 million land mines in 
the countryside. Meanwhile, drought has pushed parts of the 
nation into famine. So far, the Taliban has been unable to 
demonstrate feasible administrative, technological and 
governmental solutions to the problems.
The current situation threatens not only specific military action by 
U.S. led forces, but also the end of outside financial support.
The policy has boomeranged. The editor of the international 
Arabic paper Al-Hayat met Osama bin Laden six months ago and 
said that the aides and bodyguards who surrounded him, almost 
200 people, were all Saudis. In an article in the current Spectator 
of London, Stephen Schwartz points out that every major terrorist 
attack against the West in recent years has been conducted by 
people who have embraced Wahhabism. "Bin Laden is a 
Wahhabi. So are the suicide bombers in Israel. So are his Egyptian 
allies, who exulted as they stabbed foreign tourists to death at 
Luxor... So are the Algerian terrorists... So are the Taliban-style 
guerrillas in Kashmir." It is clear that Saudi Arabia now exports 
two products around the globe-oil and religious fanaticism.
Egypt's problem is more familiar. It has turned into something 
resembling a police state, repressing political dissent with a 
brutality that Hafez Assad of Syria would have admired. It censors 
all information that enters the country. It jails intellectuals for 
even the slightest criticism of the regime. The result is a society 
that is utterly dysfunctional, a regime deeply unpopular and 
furtive opposition movements that are increasingly extreme.
We think of our allies in the Middle East as "moderates." And 
certainly compared with the barbarians of Al Qaeda , they are 
cautious, conservative rulers. But for decades now the 
governments in Riyadh and Cairo have resisted economic and 
political modernization with disastrous results. (And Saudi Arabia 
is the richest Arab country and Egypt the most populous, so they 
are watched closely in the Middle East.) There is another path. 
Those governments that have chosen to walk ever so slowly on it-
being modern and tolerant and easing up on the police apparatus-
are actually in better shape politically. There have been few 
terrorists from Jordan, Morocco, Oman and Qatar. None of these 
regimes are democracies-elections in the Middle East would 
simply bring more Talibans into power-but they have opened up a 
little political and civil space and tried to show that Islam is 
compatible with modernity. 
It has been said that Africa is the basket case of today's global 
market, but in many ways the Arab world is in worse shape, with 
65 percent of its population under 18, stagnant economies and a 
fetid political culture. By the thousands young men are 
increasingly taking comfort in radical religious and political 
doctrines that promise salvation through a struggle with the West. 
But the focus of their hatred is their own regimes. In fact, the 
Qaeda network began in the early 1990s as a series of disparate 
groups in Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia that were seeking to 
topple their respective governments. When those efforts failed, 
they decided to attack what they saw as the power behind the 
thrones, the upholder of order in the Middle East: the United 
States of America. We are now searching for the roots of this 
conflict in Islam and in theories about the clash of civilizations. 
But the roots may lie much closer, in our association with 
dysfunctional Arab regimes that have spawned violent opposition.
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