On 21 Jul 2002 at 18:02, Jayr wrote:
> Hello there,
>
>
> hesitatingly I step out from my cozy corner of non-commitment and
> anonymity...
>
> One problem I have been considering regularly and particularly of late
> naturally came to my mind again after reading Joe’s essay on ethics.
>
> Essentially, Joe’s “rules”,
> --------------
> (a) All should be permitted to possess all freedoms they care to enjoy so
> long as they do not interfere with any of the same freedoms possessed by
> others; when these freedoms inevitably come into conflict, such conflicts
> should be resolved by equal and proportional compromise.
> (b) The universe is to be experienced and understood rather than defaced or
> destroyed.
> --------------
>
> no matter how justified (which I am not able to judge), are complicated by
> the cognitive capacity of how much information one is able to process
> regarding the boundaries of personal freedom, given this principle
> encompasses personal responsibility (and is not enforced by a government,
> for example).
>
> My concern here is not to argue on the level of rather abstract principles
> but their concrete implications. The question is, to what extend am I (read:
> is one) “supposed” to implicate my ethics on the moral level into my
> (ethical) behaviour as not to be accused of hypocrisy? It is a grave problem
> indeed, the problem of consistency between ideals and actions.
>
> I strongly believe in the virtue (i. e., I am strongly determined) to act as
> if I were responsible for all possible consequences of my actions. I am
> aware of the fact that some of my actions may have results which I could not
> have possibly anticipated; that is a matter of unhappy coincidence but not
> obviously not amendable. Yet some of my actions are probably and predictably
> followed by consequences such as effectively harming other people or the
> environment (sad enough, by not harming people, those people may in turn do
> harm to the environment and/or other people – a true dilemma, but another
> matter entirely), which are adverse to deeply held principles of a “higher
> order” (like not doing harm etc.).
>
> Where obvious, actions of this kind are naturally to be refrained from;
> otherwise it would be stark hypocrisy. Yet the world is complicated. Most
> consequences of most anything cannot possibly be anticipated, nor do you get
> feedback for all your actions as to learn from your past faults, and this is
> the point I mentioned above. It is exemplified by questions such as:
>
> When I buy something – anything – must I not take care not to support a
> company incompatible with my principles? If I don’t, is buying these
> products not due to apathy and hypocrisy?
>
> When I pay taxes to a country, must I not support all its actions? If I don’
> t, is remaining in that country not due to apathy and hypocrisy? If I don’t,
> is anything not bend on changing the way the system works via political,
> democratic effort, due to apathy and hypocrisy?
>
> And also: To what degree am I supposed to inform myself on how a company
> works, what a nation does, what effect my driving a car has on the
> environment etc.?
>
> How did you arrange yourself with this – very likely unsolvable – problem?
> The difficulty may be an essentially nominal one of where to draw the line
> between hypocrisy and consistency. It may be a personal decision, similarly
> based on an arbitrary standard of judgement, and mine may be higher or lower
> than anybody else’s. But nevertheless, I am sure someone has done some
> thinking on the topic – and I am anxious to read about it, if you have the
> time to spare.
>
Of course, given the inevitability of incomplete knowledge concerning
out choices in life (both as to the number of available alternatives and
as to their character and nature) and the further fact that we may
employ less-than-perfect logic in assessing, evaluating, and choosing
between these alternatives, we will always occasionally reap
unintended consequences. We are not perfect; in fact, we are not even
in theory perfectible. However, our existential situation is that, even
given incomplete knowledge as to our actions' consequences, we
nevertheless must choose, for we are (as Sartre said) condemned to (at
least provisional) freedom. What is important here is that we make the
effort to find out what we can about our choices, and the more important
the choice, the more diligently we should investigate, and choose
between them with benevolent intent.
>
> Jayr
>
>
>
> p.s.: Another question, to what degree should I be concerned on what other
> people do when unrelated to my personal well-being (admittedly, this is a
> topic in itself)? Why should I care for anyone’s freedom if it’s not mine?
> And isn’t freedom itself within very arbitrary boundaries – ranging from
> pure egocentricity to world-encompassing environmentalism?
>
If some are allowed to appropriate the freedoms of others by the
permissive inaction of their fellows, they may likely get the idea that
they have carte blanche to appropriate yours, and that your apathy
towards the theft of the freedoms of others would translate into your
offering only token resistance should they endeavor to enslave you. It
is wise to fight for the freedom of all so that this slippery slope is not
slidden down. The best defence against enslavement is a good
offence on behalf of freedom, and an ounce of enslavement prevention
is worth a pound of the struggle necessitated in pursuit of an after-the-
fact cure.
>
> <<Ygnailh... ygnaiih... thflthkh'ngha.... Yog-Sothoth... Y'bthnk... h'ehye -
> n'grkdl'lh...>>
>
There is no such thing as absolute freedom; freedom exists within a
field in which a plethora of choices are impossible or nonexistent (I can
walk across my room, but I cannot walk to Jupiter, for instance). Our
freedom gears itself to our situation and the array of choices it affords
that we can recognize.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sun Sep 22 2002 - 05:06:15 MDT