Thanks - I enjoyed reading it. I reformatted it too (with wrapping) if
you don't mind...
On Wednesday, July 10, 2002, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
A Short Philosophy of History
By Joe E, Dees
I. An Improved Theory of the Past
There are many existing philosophies of history, and each has its own
elements of truth, insofar as they authentically explicate an
understanding of past events and the reasons for them. However, either
by not following through with their premises to deduceable conclusions
or by actual error in such an attempt, all of them are in some respects
incomplete. This, of course, is a reason for their multiplicity and
diversity. The theory to be expounded here is to the greater degree a
decanting of the elements of each which, from our present perspective,
can be said to possess some validity. To a lesser degree, it draws from
the synthesis of these elements further conclusions as to both a
structure which may be consistently applied to history, and both
empirical observations and logical deductions which lend support to its
perceptual soundness and conceptual validity.
Before we proceed any further, a disclaimer must be made. In no
manner do we intend this theory to be construed as either final or
complete. The evolution of historical conceptions is a staircase of
successively more broad and profound conjectures which shall only end
with the end of humanity when this unfortunate yet inevitable event
occurs. This theory only proposes to be another step; another synthesis
of preceding views which itself is destined to be subsumed by a more
inclusive view. In addition, any theory, by the very definition of the
term, is necessarily restricted to the realm of probability; any theory
asserted absolutely is irretrievably mired in self-contradiction. This
is true of any theory; however it is doubly true of any historical
theory; it is impossible to either fully recapture the significance of
the past as it appeared as a present, or to a priori apprehend and
interpret as yet nonexistent future events. Even dealing solely with a
hypothetical "present", it is practically impossible to empirically
verify all logical consequences of any given theory, including a theory
of history. With these necessary limitations firmly in mind, we shall
attempt our synthesis...
What, however, is a philosophy of history, or to put it more
succinctly, what are we here attempting to do? Any philosophy is a
theory; a theory seeks to discern patterns and regularities within its
object (or subject) of perusal. History itself is a succession of more
or less purposeful actions or events occurring within the experiential
realm of a perpetually changing cast of human agents of change. For
example: the view that God moves history with an "invisible hand" is
empirically unfounded; otherwise, the hand would have to be visible to
the theorizer, and this is self-contradictory. However, no one can
reasonably deny that the idea of God in the minds of human agents has
had a profound effect upon the evolutionary direction of events. Thus a
philosophy of history seeks to discern regularities within this
perceived temporal succession, as a philosophy of personhood seeks such
regularities within the universe, etc. In addition, a philosophy seeks
logically coherent reasons for such patterns as may be discerned, and a
philosophy of history is no exception.
II. The Synthesis
Spengler is correct (as were his predecessors) concerning the
multicyclical nature of cultural rise and fall; he was incorrect in his
assertion that nothing passes on from fallen cultures to succeeding
ones, and Toynbee corrects this error. Neither of them noted, however,
the combination of successively greater pinnacles of achievement and
successively shorter spans of duration to be found within temporally
successive cultures. Cultures do fall, but not to the point that nothing
is left (that possibility is uniquely ours); however, neither do they
advance unimpeded. The actual progression is somewhere in between.
Toynbee did not realize the true force of Spenglerôs (and Sorokinôs)
raison dôetre for the falls. For both of them, the denigration of the
unifying cultural belief in the face of the counterexample of knowledge
fragments the culture. This contention, synthesized with Toynbeeôs
position that each succeeding culture begins with both more breadth of
knowledge and more depth of same than its predecessors, suggests that
within each succeeding culture the advance of knowledge to a position
contradicting belief is accomplished in a shorter time span. Therefore,
although greater syntheses are produced by succeeding cultures, they
also suffer successively shorter life spans. We called these (at first)
dolphin oscillations; we now tend to call them pre-adolescent culture
traumas. We state that the anthropomorphization of a cultural identity
is both useful and veridical, because cultures are collections of people
sharing common ground perspectives. We then explore the parallels
between the infancy of a culture and the infancy of a composite human, a
la Piaget. Piaget states that the infant is egocentric and mentally
matures in the direction of socialized thought. The infant early on
believes in a magical and animistic lived world of relatively small
dimensions which is directed towards the fulfillment of childish needs
and desires. This is not a conception; the child actually perceives the
world in this way. All things seen together are connected by
syncretistic logic ì this is known as assimilation. The world is
juxtaposed by means of this assimilation, which follows the rule of
"intellectual realism"; the world "is" as the child believes because it
òmust be", and this world-view colors the childôs perceptions to agree.
The sun and moon follow the child around, the road rises to meet
him/her, the birds sing because the child is present to hear, the scent
of the flowers is tailored to please, and all of this is managed by a
noncognitive, magical and mystical animism whose only reason for being
is to please the child. As the child matures, this magic fades. When the
child must interact with others, the necessity for developing both
concepts by which to communicate and consistent logic with which to
persuade progressively manifests. The child is no longer the absolute;
his/her position must be justified to the other. De-centering occurs.
The sun and moon follow others also, therefore they follow no one; the
road stays put, the birds sing and the flowers bloom for everyone to see
and hear and smell. In short, experience is present at hand to be taken
up by all and is no longer directed exclusively towards the now maturing
person. The living presence fades from perception as the childôs
world-view is socialized. It must therefore (for the child) be
culturally preserved.
In the same manner, a culture is primordially egocentric and
believes that the universe is somehow magically ordered for its benefit.
Such beliefs are, to some degree, necessary for the perpetuation of the
culture, but many are not sufficient ì this is why many cultures die
a-borning for lack of the beliefôs production of the Camusian byproducts
of human dignity, industry and community. These cultures which survive
their birth, however, eventually come into contact with "other"
cultures. Whether they subsume, are subsumed by, or coexist with the
other(s), intercultural socialization begins. This process results in
the realization that the belief system is not a given, but must be
justified in relation to alternative beliefs which perform the same
perpetuating functions for their cultures. (In the same manner, "laws"
of quantum mechanics mutually justify each other without any one of them
occupying a central or fundamental position.) Also, such belief systems
and their empirically testable consequences must agree with the
ever-expanding perceptions of the world. This imperative is akin to both
Kantôs dictum that concepts must be grounded in percepts, and
Merleau-Pontyôs view of reality as inter-subjective. Together, these two
necessities provoke the evolution of the bridge between individual and
societal perceptions. The foregoing also explains both T. S. Eliotôs
observation that culture and religion are symbiotic and Toynbeeôs
contention that advancing cultures are accompanied by successively more
complex belief systems, this last to accommodate successively more
inclusive and detailed perceptions.
However, the belief system ultimately fails, because of both its
absolutist dogmatism and the inherent inability of animistic-mystical
belief systems to keep pace with demythologizing explanations proferred
by technical advances.
According to Stephen Pepper, animistic world hypotheses fail due to
inadequate precision (common-sense fails). They tend to anthropomorphize
magical presence into authoritarian spirit, which is crystallized into
infallible, but, alas, all-too-fallible, authority. This authority
breaks down under successively more central, supportable and precise
criticism. Also, mystical world hypotheses fail due to a lack of scope.
Their view originates with the acceptance of a "central fact". The
entire universe is interpreted, whether it fits or not, as absorbed
within this "fact". Where this absorption is implausible, the offending
fact is denounced as unreal. The adherents of such "facts" are emotional
and reductionistic. They believe themselves to be the vessels through
which the "true fact" must be promulgated according to a dogma of
certainty.
Both "certainty" and "infallibility" are illusions produced by
inadequate world-views. What opposes them is useful truth. The
pragmatists argue that the a priori of truth is utility and the
existentialists argue that the a priori of utility is truth. The
precedence chosen depends upon the referential frame of the chooser, and
we tend to view truth and utility as co-primordial, symbiotic and
mutually grounding. However, when useful truth unmasks by counterexample
of the world hypothesesô conclusions the fallibility and uncertainty of
their premises, these premises inevitably crumble. Our beliefs have, for
better or worse, chosen us long enough; it is now time to reasonably
choose our beliefs to avoid such contradiction. Culture has never
matured (except for the perceptual side in the Orient) before in world
history; we can end all hope of its maturation in the future or
ourselves be the first culture which successfully matures.
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