>Moral judgements are not
>morally wrong, they're just factually wrong where they
>assume objectivity, and practically wrong where they
>fail to minimise suffering.
>I agree that values, preferably shared, are necessary to
>guide our actions, and you can call that morality if you
>like, but I insist that when it's examined, it has to be
>shown to be based on practicality -- so that
>*fundamentally* there's no morality in it.
>I don't know about your definition, but I hold the
>view that suffering is bad on entirely practical
>grounds -- we don't enjoy it, it is unnecessary,
>therefore we are better off without it. Where's the
>morality there?
Again. Since you say you "don't know about my definition", I'm
curious as to the significance of your reply other than to repeat
yourself. I would invite you to get to know my definition and let me
know what you think, since it's pretty crucial to the point that I'm
making.
The position that suffering is BAD and practicality is GOOD is
based on moral underpinnings. It is not some absolute truth, and if you
justify it by saying that "we don't enjoy suffering, it is unnecessary",
you are in fact making the (moral) judgement that things that we enjoy
are GOOD and things that are unnecessary are BAD.
I, the professed moralist, am not proceeding from subjective
assumptions- that distinction is your own. I am trying to look at the
soft, gooey innards of why we think things are GOOD and BAD, trying to
get to the values that underlie our MORALITY.
This argument will become tiresome to both of us within one exchange or
so unless we push through to some new place. You are clearly
uncomfortable with the "label" of morality, which is fine, but you
cannot then strut the "objective truth" of your position, slinging barbs
>>The only reason to make a
>>moral judgement is to feel superior. And I'm no better than
>>those who do so. I don't cling to that particular delusion,
>>but I'm no better. Just better off.
at others who are more comfortable with the terms, and the debate. You,
in your denial of the thing called "morality", are pursuing a more and
more specious argument as you try to prove that some things are
objectively "right" or "wrong" while denying that there's any such thing
as "good" and "bad". In for a penny, in for a pound.
If, in fact, there is a closet moralist in this discussion, it is the
Buddhist. It's always the one you least suspect...
Love,
Ian