No it doesn't! It's merely your assumption that anyone
holding such a view would take a moral stance on it.
What you're not considering is that it is possible to
hold that view on entirely practical grounds, and take
no moral stance whatsoever. Moral judgements are not
morally wrong, they're just factually wrong where they
assume objectivity, and practically wrong where they
fail to minimise suffering.
> Some clarification. "Morality", in what I assert is the common
>view, is the notion that there is "good" and "bad" (as opposed to
>ethics, dealing with behavior and notions of "right" and "wrong").
>Morality is not necessarily based in a view of "what God wants"; it
>doesn't have to derive from religion or from anything not verifyable,
>what it requires is a shared underpinning of "values", which I assert
>can exist in an observable place outside of memetic transfer.
I agree that values, preferably shared, are necessary to
guide our actions, and you can call that morality if you
like, but I insist that when it's examined, it has to be
shown to be based on practicality -- so that
*fundamentally* there's no morality in it.
[snip]
> >>Buddhism advocates compassion, not because it's moral,
> >>or proper, or because God/Buddha says so, but because
> >>it minimises suffering, which is precisely what we all
> >>want anyway. With sufficient practicality of that sort
> >>there's no need for morality, whatsoever.
>
>
> Indeed. I'm not sure what you consider "morality", but the
>notion that it is GOOD to minimize suffering and BAD to increase it
>falls within my definition.
I don't know about your definition, but I hold the
view that suffering is bad on entirely practical
grounds -- we don't enjoy it, it is unnecessary,
therefore we are better off without it. Where's the
morality there?
-- Robin