>
> At 10:11 PM 6/30/98 -0400, Eric Boyd wrote:
> >
> >Dan Plante <danp@CS347838-A.gvcl1.bc.wave.home.com> writes:
> >
> >> Unless an entity has the three necessary prerequisites to form a
> >> self-aware mind, even the term "meaning" won't have any meaning.
> >
> >One: what are the three prerequisites necessary to form a self-aware
> >(conscious) mind? Can you refer me to a good source?
>
> Yes, my previous posts. If you recall, it's my contention that,
> from a functional perspective, a mind is the emergent phenomenon
> that arises from the balanced interaction of three distinct, irreducible,
> fundamental components:
>
> motivator
> accumulator
> facilitator
>
> These three fundamental components are commonly referred to as
> (respectively):
>
> emotion
> memory
> intelligence
I would label intelligence as the calculator or processor, and
reserve facilitator for the mobility/motility function of the body,
which facilitates the interaction with the environment which provides
the accumulator, memory, with data, which the calculator/processor
converts into information, to file (commit to memory). This
information can be accessed (remembered) when needed, and reprocessed
(broken into its constituent parts and recombined in novel ways)
during cognition. and thus serve as the foundation from which emotion
can choose and build future plans of action. See WHAT COMPUTERS
CAN'T DO by Stuart Dreyfus on the existential necessity of possessing
a phenomenal body subject to rewarding and punishing reinforcements
from its environment for meaningful learning (learning that matters -
the results of which can be of benefit - to the learner personally)
to occur.
> Interacting in the proper way (each one interfaced to the other in a
> closed-loop negative-feedback regime), this "triad of mind"
> is all that is needed to give rise to awareness. As in my earlier
> post defining curiosity as a direct manifestation of one particular
> facet of the /interaction/ of emotion and intelligence, the mind is a
> direct manifestation of (i.e. is an emergent property of) the
> complete /interaction/ of all three parts.
>
> In humans, the functional parts can be loosely ascribed to the
> following physical structures of the brain (respectively):
>
> limbic system
> mid-brain structures
> cortical structures
>
> Note that the above is only one specific example of the /physical/
> structures necessary for giving rise to the phenomenon of mind. The
> actual physical implementation is irrelevant, as long as these
> three fundamental /functional/ components exist and interact appropriately.
> The point is, you never need more than these three, and you can't do
> it with less than these three or any three /other/ than these.
>
> If correct, this generates some interesting implications:
>
> 1) The basic functional blocks exist to describe the design and
> construction of a mind, which can then be used to confirm/refute
> the theory through a Turing test.
>
> 2) It also forms the basis of xenopsychology, and demands that emotions
> (some form of survival-maximizing motivator) must be universal (sorry,
> no Vulcans allowed), and all that /that/ implies....
>
> etc, etc.
>
> I should also make clear that I did not use the term "self-awareness"
> in reference to the "triad of mind" for a reason. If you think about it,
> a mind as described by this theory implies awareness, but not
> /self/-awareness,
> because the memory component does not contain the concept of "self". This mind
> has /memory/, but it's blank. It does not, as described, express or imply any
> particular /content/ in that memory. Since the self is a concept or idea
> (meme)
> that might be found /in/ memory, the theory does not expressly demand it.
>
> Of course, this is an idealized, sanitary treatment. In reality,
> at birth, there are mechanisms to make sure that self-awareness will
> arise in the mind. The existence of the senses alone will ensure this,
> but congenital instincts and reflexes acting to improve infant survival
> will also have the effect of accelerating self awareness by forcing
> behavior that has a greater-than-random chance of providing important
> sensory patterns to the awakening mind.
>
> >(I intend to read Consciousness Explained yet this summer, is it good?)
>
> I don't know. I haven't read it.
>
> >Two: in your opinion, can *science* answer the question "why"? (in the
> >sense which you used in your last post) If not, why not, and what
> >system-of-finding-answers do you recommend instead?
>
> "Science" can, and does, answer the question "why" everyday. It is,
> after all, simply a process of rational thought leading to independently
> verifiable answers. That's the sense I used in my post, but I get the
> impression you might mean the "ultimate" question - why does anything
> exist at all - is that correct? If it is, then I made the point in my
> post that this is exactly where science can't help, it can't answer
> this question for anyone, and it is this question, ultimately, that is
> at the heart of people's "spiritual angst" and also at the heart of the
> discussion. If you are referring to neither of these, then I'm afraid
> I don't know what you mean.
>
> >> Whether or not objects should even be granted intentionality
> >> /at all/, is decided by your own inherent intellectual, emotional,
> >> and memetic makeup. I acknowledge that you and I can't do that,
> >> but most people can.
> >
> >You and I can't grant objects intentionally? The first sentence here is a
> >tautology, my question is: did you say the last sentence correctly?
> >
> >I usually have no problem assigning intentionally to objects around me...
> >certainly my wrenches get up and walk away on a regular basis...
>
> I assumed, in responding to your original post, that by saying
> "intentionality" you were referring to the act of ascribing a sense
> of "spirituality" to inanimate objects, and that you were of the
> opinion that this is folly. I agreed. I therefore concluded that
> "you and I can't do that", although maybe rephrasing it to "I
> acknowledge that you and I can't bring ourselves to do something
> like that" might have communicated the idea to you better. But I
> meant it literally. I've tried "fooling" myself. I can't do it.
> Even when I end up with six unpaired socks in my dryer.
>
> Dan
>