Yes, my previous posts. If you recall, it's my contention that,
from a functional perspective, a mind is the emergent phenomenon
that arises from the balanced interaction of three distinct, irreducible,
fundamental components:
motivator
accumulator
facilitator
These three fundamental components are commonly referred to as
(respectively):
emotion
memory
intelligence
Interacting in the proper way (each one interfaced to the other in a
closed-loop negative-feedback regime), this "triad of mind"
is all that is needed to give rise to awareness. As in my earlier
post defining curiosity as a direct manifestation of one particular
facet of the /interaction/ of emotion and intelligence, the mind is a
direct manifestation of (i.e. is an emergent property of) the
complete /interaction/ of all three parts.
In humans, the functional parts can be loosely ascribed to the
following physical structures of the brain (respectively):
limbic system
mid-brain structures
cortical structures
Note that the above is only one specific example of the /physical/
structures necessary for giving rise to the phenomenon of mind. The
actual physical implementation is irrelevant, as long as these
three fundamental /functional/ components exist and interact appropriately.
The point is, you never need more than these three, and you can't do
it with less than these three or any three /other/ than these.
If correct, this generates some interesting implications:
1) The basic functional blocks exist to describe the design and
construction of a mind, which can then be used to confirm/refute
the theory through a Turing test.
2) It also forms the basis of xenopsychology, and demands that emotions
(some form of survival-maximizing motivator) must be universal (sorry,
no Vulcans allowed), and all that /that/ implies....
etc, etc.
I should also make clear that I did not use the term "self-awareness"
in reference to the "triad of mind" for a reason. If you think about it,
a mind as described by this theory implies awareness, but not
/self/-awareness,
because the memory component does not contain the concept of "self". This mind
has /memory/, but it's blank. It does not, as described, express or imply any
particular /content/ in that memory. Since the self is a concept or idea
(meme)
that might be found /in/ memory, the theory does not expressly demand it.
Of course, this is an idealized, sanitary treatment. In reality,
at birth, there are mechanisms to make sure that self-awareness will
arise in the mind. The existence of the senses alone will ensure this,
but congenital instincts and reflexes acting to improve infant survival
will also have the effect of accelerating self awareness by forcing
behavior that has a greater-than-random chance of providing important
sensory patterns to the awakening mind.
>(I intend to read Consciousness Explained yet this summer, is it good?)
I don't know. I haven't read it.
>Two: in your opinion, can *science* answer the question "why"? (in the
>sense which you used in your last post) If not, why not, and what
>system-of-finding-answers do you recommend instead?
"Science" can, and does, answer the question "why" everyday. It is,
after all, simply a process of rational thought leading to independently
verifiable answers. That's the sense I used in my post, but I get the
impression you might mean the "ultimate" question - why does anything
exist at all - is that correct? If it is, then I made the point in my
post that this is exactly where science can't help, it can't answer
this question for anyone, and it is this question, ultimately, that is
at the heart of people's "spiritual angst" and also at the heart of the
discussion. If you are referring to neither of these, then I'm afraid
I don't know what you mean.
>> Whether or not objects should even be granted intentionality
>> /at all/, is decided by your own inherent intellectual, emotional,
>> and memetic makeup. I acknowledge that you and I can't do that,
>> but most people can.
>
>You and I can't grant objects intentionally? The first sentence here is a
>tautology, my question is: did you say the last sentence correctly?
>
>I usually have no problem assigning intentionally to objects around me...
>certainly my wrenches get up and walk away on a regular basis...
I assumed, in responding to your original post, that by saying
"intentionality" you were referring to the act of ascribing a sense
of "spirituality" to inanimate objects, and that you were of the
opinion that this is folly. I agreed. I therefore concluded that
"you and I can't do that", although maybe rephrasing it to "I
acknowledge that you and I can't bring ourselves to do something
like that" might have communicated the idea to you better. But I
meant it literally. I've tried "fooling" myself. I can't do it.
Even when I end up with six unpaired socks in my dryer.
Dan