>(1) Any statement is either falsifiable or it's either a "tautology" or an
>"axiom".
>(2) Falsifiable statements are useful, tautologies and axioms are not.
>(3) A falsifiable statement (A) cannot be a tautology or an axiom (B) at
the
>same time. In other words A=A.
>Seriously. Can we prove *anything* without axioms? Isn't a proof by
>definition something like: "If a then b". The first "a" (the "pra-a")
must
>be assumed. The other option is to follow an authority (like Popper) and
>believe that "no-axiom" logic is possible.
Tad--Maybe there's an easy way to explain the problem with 'Ais A'. Let's
say you read stuff by Popper, as well as that PCR paper, and then you think
PCR is just nonsense, and you figure out that I'm only advocating PCR to
get accepted into the society of Virions and that I believe whatever the
group believes. In this case, my "social metphysician" nature is what it
is--A is A, right? But on the other hand, let's say after doing some
research, you realize that the philosophy you've advocated is only part of
a long tradition of idea systems which don't work, containing a certain
flaw called *justificationism*, which PCR does not contain. And, that I had
a good reason for say, acting pro-PCR, besides wanting to be a member of
the Virions. My nature turns out to seem different than the first scenario,
but since my nature is what it is, A is A. So, A is A, regardless of what
you find out. Do you see why 'A is A' is ambiguous?
--David R.