Hi,
KMO <kmo@c-realm.com> writes:
Faith and phaith differ in that the former advises breaking (2) when
evidence *is* actually present, while the latter says that {in cases
where evidence can never be applied / for non-falsifiable
propositions}, you may choose to believe/value/embody the proposition,
rather than taking the agnostic position.
<<
[snip]
My guess is that David would agree that the maxim is falsifiable and
saythat his belief in it is proportionate with the evidence for it,
i.e. overwhelming, but subject to re-examination in light of new
evidence. But that doesn't really work, does it? It would be his
commitment to rationality that would prescribe re-examining the maxim
in light of that new evidence. Hmmm.... tricky.
>>
As opposed to the usefulness of the proposition? The value of the proposition? I've got an interesting idea: could one have phaith in the value of the proposition; i.e. embody the proposition, bring it to life, as it were; and then also have a rational argument which supports it's truth? (and hold the truth value of the proposition according to the evidence)
In this way, we can continue to say that phaith, per say, has nothing to do with truth; phaith has to do with value, with meaning and gnosis (self-knowledge).
ERiC