The Real Surge
By DJ Elliott
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/the_real_surge.php

While the "surge" of five US brigades plus their accompanying support elements, about 30,000 US troops total, is the main focus of commentators when discussing the current situation in Iraq, the real surge in Iraq is happening behind the scenes. The rapidly expanding Iraqi Army is where the real surge in forces is occurring.

In November 2006, Prime Minister Maliki understated the real surge when he announced the increase of the Iraqi Army beyond the subjective counterinsurgency force. Maliki’s originally announced plan was an increase of the army by three divisions, five brigades, 20 battalions, and an Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) battalion. He also wanted to increase the manning of existing Iraqi units to 110 percent. At that point, the Iraqi Army was 10 divisions, 35 brigades, 102 battalions, and two ISOF battalions. Most Iraqi Army formations were only approximately 65 percent manned at that time.

Over the last year the Iraqi Army has grown to 12 divisions, 41 brigades, 123 battalions, and four ISOF battalions. This is a 20 percent increase in units and a doubling of the ISOF. This does not include the three former strategic infrastructure brigades (17 battalions) that have been transferred to the Iraqi Army and are currently being retrained. While the Iraqi Army officer and NCO ranks remain undermanned, the overall unit manning has grown to 108 percent during that time. This does not mention the steadily increasing Iraqi Army competence that can only come from combat and counterinsurgency experience.

The newly formed Iraqi Army units over the past year include:

3-9 Tank Brigade - North Baghdad/Strategic Reserve (Deployed to Basrah)
4-9 Light Armored Cavalry Brigade- North Baghdad/Strategic Reserve (Stryker training)
4-4 Brigade - Salahadin
2-14 Brigade - Basrah (originally 5-10 Brigade)
11th Division Headquarters - East Baghdad
3-11 Brigade - Sadr City (Graduated Besmaya on November 18)
2-11 Brigade - East Baghdad (Training at Besmaya)
14th Division Headquarters - Basrah
Two battalions of ISOF (Basrah Battalion and four separate companies)

By the time the US plans to reduce its combat forces to pre-surge levels (July 2008), the real surge is planned to have increased the Iraqi Army to 13 divisions, 49 brigades, 154 battalions, and five or six ISOF battalions. This includes finishing the retraining and equipping of the former Strategic Infrastructure Brigades (SIBs) transferred to the Iraqi Army. The manning of the Iraqi Army is currently planned to reach 120 percent of unit strength by July 2008. From the time the US surge of only five combat brigades was announced to the time it ends, the real surge will have increased the Iraqi Army field forces by 30 percent in divisions, 40 percent in brigades, 50 percent in battalions, and 150 percent in ISOF. In addition the existing Iraqi Army combat unit manning will have increased to 120 percent from the pre-surge level of approximately 65 percent.

The Iraqi Army will field the following units by July 2008:

4-3 Brigade - Southwest Ninawa
4-5 Brigade - Diyala
4-7 Light Armored Cavalry Brigade - Anbar (Rutbah)
3-14 Brigade - Basrah
4-14 Brigade - Basrah
12th Division Headquarters - Tikrit
1-12 Brigade - Western Kirkuk (retrained SIBs)
2-12 Brigade - Northern Salahadin (retrained SIBs)
3-12 Brigade - Southern Salahadin (retrained SIBs)
One or two more battalions of ISOF and ISOF Aviation Squadron

The US is considering plans to draw down to 10 combat brigades by early 2009. The Iraqi Army plans to continue growing to 13 divisions, 52 brigades, 162 battalions, and seven or eight ISOF battalions. This does not include the additional fire support, logistics, and engineer battalions being formed for each brigade. Part of that increase is the 33,000 Iraqi Army support troops that was funded by the US FY07 Supplemental. These additional 33,000 soldiers represent a 250 percent increase over the current 14,000 Iraqi Army support troops. This increased logistics support will allow Iraqi Army units to operate independently and will release US logistics units for redeployment.

The Iraqi Army will field the following units between July 2008 and early 2009:

4-12 Brigade - Salahadin
4-1 Brigade - Eastern Anbar (replacement for redesignated 4-11)
1-10 Brigade - Maysan (possibly DhiQar; replacement for redesignated 3-
One or two more battalions of ISOF
One fire support battalion per brigade
Finish adding the engineer regiments to the divisions (three battalions each)
In 2009 the Iraqi Army plans to start forming the 13 divisional field artillery regiments and their 39 subordinate field artillery battalions.

This is the real surge -- a surge in training and building of the Iraqi Army. Security in Iraq improves with an increased long-term security presence; a security presence that will increasingly be shouldered by Iraqi troops. The five US surge brigades were not only brought in to buy the Iraqi government time to sort out the political situation, they were brought in to buy the Iraqi Army time to expand. The five US surge brigades are doing some much needed housecleaning in Iraq's problem areas, freeing up Iraqi Army formations to provide cadre for new forming units, and providing additional training partners for the new Iraqi Army formations thus facilitating the accelerated expansion. The Iraqi Army is replacing the US forces departing Iraqi by the end of 2008 at rate of two Iraqi brigades for one US brigade.

While the surge brigades will eventually depart, the Iraqi Army is not leaving Iraq.


The Failures of Lt. Gen. Sanchez
By Jack Kelly
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/11/the_failures_of_lt_gen_sanchez.html

In his weekly radio address, President Bush gave thanks for American servicemen "who risk their own lives to keep us safe."

Democrats chose retired Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez to deliver a rebuttal.

"I saw firsthand the consequences of the administration's failure to devise a strategy for victory in Iraq that employed, in a coordinated manner, the political, economic, diplomatic and military power of the United States. That failure continues today," he said.

LtGen. Sanchez endorsed the Democratic measure pending in Congress to condition continued funding for the war on a timetable for troop withdrawal.

"Although we cannot withdraw precipitously from Iraq, we must move rapidly to minimize our force presence," he said.

Martin Peretz of the New Republic suspects Democrats want to withdraw troops from Iraq quickly because they don't want to win there.

"I suspect that so many Democrats are so deeply hostile to a forward foreign policy and their minds so deeply embedded in the notion that you can negotiate successfully with fanatics and tyrants that they wouldn't mind a prophylactic victory for the enemy," he wrote Monday.

If you want to lose a war, who better to deliver that message than a loser?

Mr. Sanchez, who commanded U.S. troops in Iraq from June 2003 to June 2004, is a retired three star general instead of a serving four star general chiefly because the Abu Ghraib prison scandal happened on his watch. But that may have been the least of his failings. The year he was in charge was the year the insurgency took root.

"Fairly or unfairly, Gen. Ricardo Sanchez always will be remembered as America's incompetent field commander in Iraq," wrote counterinsurgency expert "Abu Muqawama" on his blog. ("Abu Muqawama" is Arabic for "father of resistance.") I think much of the criticism of Gen. Sanchez ought to be directed at the more senior leaders in the Army at the time, because the poor man was virtually set up for failure. Not only was he just a three star in what should have been a four star billet, he was a newly minted three star. He had less experience in and knowledge of Iraq than any other general officer who served during the war. It is no reflection on his personal qualities to say that he was an appallingly bad choice.

But though Ricardo Sanchez had lots of help in becoming a failure, and lots of company, the fact is that he was a failure, and that most of the responsibility for being a failure rests on the shoulders of...Ricardo Sanchez.

Sanchez implies "that somehow he was a blameless bystander and not the one entrusted with day-to-day operations during the critical year following regime change in Iraq," noted the Small Wars Journal. "It appears that Sanchez did not have a problem with U.S. strategy at that time. Moreover, as the senior commander he had the authority to take measures that could have lessened the impact of a failed or nonexistent strategy had he so desired."

It does seem odd that Democrats would excoriate Gen. David Petraeus, architect of the strategy that has turned things around in Iraq, and embrace Gen. Sanchez, especially since it was Democrats in Congress who led the criticism of him during the Abu Ghraib affair.

Historian Victor Davis Hanson likens Gen. Sanchez to other "whistleblowers" such as former CIA officer Michael Scheuer and former National Security Council staffer Richard Clarke who were failures at their jobs.

"In all these cases there is a dismal pattern: a mediocre functionary keeps quiet about the mess around him, muddles through, senses that things aren't going right, finds himself on the losing end of political infighting, is forced out or quits, seethes that his genius wasn't recognized, takes no responsibility for his own failures, worries that he might be scape-goated, and at last senses that either a New York publisher or the anti-war Left, or both, will be willing to offer him cash or notoriety -- but only if he serves their needs by trashing his former colleagues in a manner he never would while on the job," Mr. Hanson said.