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Topic: U.S. to Label Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Terrorists (Read 563 times) |
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Bass
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I'm a llama!
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U.S. to Label Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Terrorists
« on: 2007-08-17 15:56:31 » |
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Quote:The United States has decided to designate Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as a “specially designated global terrorist,” U.S. officials told the Washington Post.
The Revolutionary Guards is a military body formed in 1979 and is a powerful political and economic force in Iran.
The move will allow the U.S. to target the organization’s finances and vast business operations both inside and outside of Iran. |
http://rawstory.com/news/2007/Upping_ante_US_to_label_Iranian_0814.html
Dose anyone else know what to say about this? I mean, the only word that comes to mind is idiots!
Considering how many innocent civilians the US and their "military branches" have killed, how much property they have destroyed, how often they have violated international law, how about we declare, for example, the US Marine Corps a terror organization? They deserve it far more than these Iranians. The current US administration is beyond repair.
Watching America fall from its post as the only real superpower is not going to be pretty. Anyway, just something I wanted to quickly share. I mean WTF?
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Blunderov
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"We think in generalities, we live in details"
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Re:U.S. to Label Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Terrorists
« Reply #1 on: 2007-08-18 07:58:13 » |
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Romans 2:1 Therefore you have no excuse, everyone of you who passes judgment, for in that which you judge another, you condemn yourself; for you who judge practice the same things.
Matthew 7:3 And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?
[Blunderov] More provocation by the Bushevisti. They talk the talk but this is cold-war style posturing. Everybody, and very especially Iran, knows that they cannot walk the walk. No money. No allies whether Western or Arab. No international credibility. No domestic political capital.
No army. THAT really worries me I admit. But a conventional invasion? No way.
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Blunderov
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"We think in generalities, we live in details"
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Re:U.S. to Label Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Terrorists
« Reply #2 on: 2007-08-22 17:16:30 » |
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[Blunderov] Some cogent analysis that reveals the shortcomings of The Boy General's strategic vision in a very stark light indeed. (He may have single handedly un-won the cold war quite apart from anything else.) What Strafor have to say about the window of opportunity for Russia probably goes double for China.
stratfor.com
Window of Opportunity; Window of Vulnerability
All U.S. presidents eventually become lame ducks, though the lameness of any particular duck depends on the amount of power he has left to wield. It not only is an issue of the president's popularity, but also of the opposition's unity and clarity. In the international context, the power of a lame duck president depends on the options he has militarily. Foreign powers do not mess with American presidents, no matter how lame one might be, as long as the president retains military options.
The core of the American presidency is in its role as commander in chief. With all of the other presidential powers deeply intersecting with those of Congress and the courts, the president has the greatest autonomous power when he is acting as supreme commander of the armed forces. There is a remarkable lot he can do if he wishes to, and relatively little Congress can do to stop him -- unless it is uniquely united. Therefore, foreign nations remain wary of the American president's military power long after they have stopped taking him seriously in other aspects of foreign relations.
There is a school of thought that argues that President George W. Bush is likely to strike at Iran before he leaves office. The sense is that Bush is uniquely indifferent to either Congress or public opinion and that he therefore is likely to use his military powers in some decisive fashion, under the expectation and hope that history will vindicate him. In that sense, Bush is very much not a lame duck, because if he wanted to strike, there is nothing legally preventing him from doing so. The endless debates over presidential powers -- which have roiled both Republican and Democratic administrations -- have left one thing clear: The courts will not intervene against an American president's use of his power as commander in chief. Congress may cut off money after the fact, but as we have seen, that is not a power that is normally put to use.
The problem for Bush, of course, is that he is fighting two simultaneous wars, one in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. These wars have sucked up the resources of the U.S. Army to a remarkable degree. Units are either engaged in these theaters of operation, recovering from deployment or preparing for deployment. To an extraordinary degree, the United States does not have a real strategic reserve in its ground forces, the Army and the Marines. A force could probably be scraped up to deal with a limited crisis, but U.S. forces are committed and there are no more troops to scatter around.
The United States faces another potential theater of operations in Iran. Fighting there might not necessarily be something initiated by the United States. The Iranians might choose to create a crisis the United States couldn’t avoid. That would suck up not only what little ground reserves are available, but also a good part of U.S. air and naval forces. The United States would be throwing all of its chips on the table, with few reserves left. With all U.S. forces engaged in a line from the Euphrates to the Hindu Kush, the rest of the world would be wide open to second-tier powers.
This is Bush's strategic problem -- the one that shapes his role as commander in chief. He has committed virtually all of his land forces to two wars. His only reserves are the Air Force and Navy. If they were sucked into a war in Iran, it would limit U.S. reserves for other contingencies. The United States alone does not get to choose whether there is a crisis with Iran. Iran gets to vote too. We don’t believe there will be a military confrontation with Iran, but the United States must do its contingency planning as if there will be.
Thus, Bush is a lame-duck commander in chief as well. Even if he completely disregards the politics of his position, which he can do, he still lacks the sheer military resources to achieve any meaningful goal without the use of nuclear weapons. But his problem goes beyond the Iran scenario. Lacking ground forces, the president's ability to influence events throughout the world is severely impaired. Moreover, if he were to throw his air forces into a non-Iranian crisis, all pressure on Iran would be lifted. The United States is strategically tapped out. There is no land force available and the use of air and naval forces without land forces, while able to achieve some important goals, would not be decisive.
The United States has entered a place where it has almost no room to maneuver. The president is becoming a lame duck in the fullest sense of the term. This opens a window of opportunity for powers, particularly second-tier powers, that would not be prepared to challenge the United States while its forces had flexibility. One power in particular has begun to use this window of opportunity -- Russia.
Russia is not the country it was 10 years ago. Its economy, fueled by rising energy and mineral prices, is financially solvent. The state has moved from being a smashed relic of the Soviet era to becoming a more traditional Russian state: authoritarian, repressive, accepting private property but only under terms it finds acceptable. It also is redefining its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and reviving its military.
For example, a Russian aircraft recently fired a missile at a Georgian village. Intentionally or not, the missile was a dud, though it clearly was meant to signal to the Georgians -- close allies of the United States and unfriendly to Russian interests in the region -- that not only is Russia unhappy, it is prepared to take military action if it chooses. It also clearly told the Georgians that the Russians are unconcerned about the United States and its possible response. It must have given the Georgians a chill.
The Russians planted their flag under the sea at the North Pole after the Canadians announced plans to construct armed icebreakers and establish a deepwater port from which to operate in the Far North. The Russians announced the construction of a new air defense system by 2015 -- not a very long time as these things go. They also announced plans to create a new command and control system in the same time frame. Russian long-range aircraft flew east in the Pacific to the region of Guam, an important U.S. air base, causing the United States to scramble fighter planes. They also flew into what used to be the GIUK gap (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) probing air defenses along the Norwegian coast and in Scotland.
Most interestingly, they announced the resumption of patrols in the Atlantic, along the U.S. coast, using Blackjack strategic bombers and the old workhorse of the Russian fleet, the Bear. (The balance does remain in U.S. favor along the East Coast). During the Cold War, patrols such as these were designed to carry out electronic and signal intelligence. They were designed to map out U.S. facilities along the Eastern seaboard and observe response time and procedures. During the Cold War they would land in Cuba for refueling before retracing their steps. It will be interesting to see whether Russia will ask Cuba for landing privileges and whether the Cubans will permit it. As interesting, Russian and Chinese troops conducted military exercises recently in the context of regional talks. It is not something to take too seriously, but then they are not trivial.
Many of these are older planes. The Bear, for example, dates back to the 1950s -- but so does the B-52, which remains important to the U.S. strategic bomber fleet. The age of the airframe doesn't matter nearly as much as maintenance, refits, upgrades to weapons and avionics and so on. Nothing can be assumed from the mere age of the aircraft.
The rather remarkable flurry of Russian air operations -- as well as plans for naval development -- is partly a political gesture. The Russians are tired of the United States pressing into their sphere of influence, and they see a real window of opportunity to press back with limited risk of American response. But the Russians appear to be doing more than making a gesture.
The Russians are trying to redefine the global balance. They are absolutely under no illusion that they can match American military power in any sphere. But they are clearly asserting their right to operate as a second-tier global power and are systematically demonstrating their global reach. They may be old and they may be slow, but when American aircraft on the East Coast start to scramble routinely to intercept and escort Russian aircraft, two things happen. First, U.S. military planning has to shift to take Russia into account. Second, the United States loses even more flexibility. It can't just ignore the Russians. It now needs to devote scarce dollars to upgrading systems along the East Coast -- systems that have been quite neglected since the end of the Cold War.
There is a core assumption in the U.S. government that Russia no longer is a significant power. It is true that its vast army has disintegrated. But the Russians do not need a vast army modeled on World War II. They need, and have begun to develop, a fairly effective military built around special forces and airborne troops. They also have appeared to pursue their research and development, particularly in the area of air defense and air-launched missiles -- areas in which they have traditionally been strong. The tendency to underestimate the Russian military -- something even Russians do -- is misplaced. Russia's military is capable and improving.
The increased Russian tempo of operations in areas that the United States has been able to ignore for many years further pins the United States. It can be assumed that the Russians mean no harm -- but assumption is not a luxury national security planners can permit themselves, at least not good ones. It takes years to develop and deploy new systems. If the Russians are probing the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic again, it is not the current threat that matters, but the threat that might evolve. That diverts budget dollars from heavily armored trucks that can survive improvised explosive device attacks, and cuts into the Air Force and Navy.
The Russians are using the window of opportunity to redefine, in a modest way, the global balance and gain some room to maneuver in their region. As a result of their more assertive posture, American thoughts of unilateral interventions must decline. For example, getting involved in Georgia once was a low-risk activity. The risk just went up. Taking that risk while U.S. ground forces are completely absorbed in Iraq and Afghanistan is hard for the Americans to justify -- but rather easy for the Russians.
This brings us back to the discussion of the commander in chief's options in the Middle East. The United States already has limited options against Iran. The more the Russians maneuver, the more the United States must hold what forces it has left -- Air Force and Navy -- in reserve. Launching an Iranian adventure becomes that much more risky. If it is launched, Russia has an even greater window of opportunity. Every further involvement in the region makes the United States that much less of a factor in the immediate global equation.
All wars end, and these will too. The Russians are trying to rearrange the furniture a bit before anyone comes home and forces them out. They are dealing with a lame duck president with fewer options than most lame ducks. Before there is a new president and before the war in Iraq ends, the Russians want to redefine the situation a bit.
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MoEnzyme
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Re:U.S. to Label Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Terrorists
« Reply #3 on: 2007-08-22 20:15:49 » |
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If I were a neo-con who still had some neurons responding to reality instead of all the kool-aid I just drank . . . what a wacky hypothesis! But why not?
Well lets start with the blantantly stupid ideas that we can only hope don't come to fruition. Their being stupid ideas probably serves as no insurance since the GOP prides itself on being the party of [stupid] ideas. But as I said I'll assume that I'm a neo-con with some still non-dysfunctional neurons at work. I don't know who that would be in this administration, but considering that many have and will jump ship near the end . . . some partially sane human may escape the neo-con vetting this adminstration has strictly imposed so far.
Okay, yeah, the stupid ideas . . . Invading Iran, that's really stupid. Nuking Iran, possibly stupider. Bombing Iran's nuclear capacity, we could possibly survive the short term on this, but we have so much already committed and have so few good friends left that this is blatantly stupid as well, if only by a few orders of magnitude instead of exponentially blatantly stupid like the previous two stupidities . . . so perhaps that's the one we should really worry about. I seem to recall some GOPers like the disappointing McCain suggesting this publicly. But its still blatantly stupid.
But I'm talking about something that might make actual strategic sense. I could be off the mark here, but given that 1) the Kurds are the only Iraqis who might possibly work with us anymore, 2) that a unified Iraq is increasingly unlikely as political progress post surge is essentially nil, 3) that Iran is already strengthened by our previous blatant stupidities and 4) that Iran may get some nukes regardless of our best efforts to stop them, and 5) that we (the US or what is left of us) have already proven our willingness to toss international agreements in the toilet anyway . . . Perhaps we could reconsider this non-proliferation idea in favor of nuclear welfare.
So we set up the Kurds, who are already more autonomous than the rest of Iraq, on their way to some sort of proto-nation. I've heard from a number of Kurds in the media and if they are at all representative of the rest of them, it wouldn't take much of a push at all. And then we pull a Cuban missle crises out of the hat . . . only this time WE are the ones basing nukes in the embryonic Kurdistan. We could even withdraw our troops from the rest of Iraq for some safer bases in Kurdistan. That way no matter if Iran got nukes, we've got a counterbalancing nuclear force literally next door (in addition to the ones Israel has but doesn't admit to), with possibly even less extension of our conventional forces if not even providing us some much needed slack in our over-deployment.
Of course that will piss off the Turks, but they don't have any nukes. And perhaps if we just concentrate on making-peace/asking-forgiveness with just one other country (Turkey) instead of the entire middle east, maybe even a Republican could succeed. It seems wacky, but certainly no more than the crazy than the prayerful religious right mental processes that got us into this predicament in the first place.
Oh yeah, and another problem is that the rest of Iraq will get on with the civil war they are obviously prepared for and all the nasty bloodshed that goes along with civil wars, but conveniently that would probably serve as all the more reason that we would HAVE to protect the Kurds. After all they almost got gassed out by Saddam; we could even frame it in terms of not denying yet another Holocaust.
Oh, the last problem, we would be giving up on nuclear non-proliferation, which would mean that Russia's friends get them too. That would suck, but then they didn't nuke us when it was just us and them, so perhaps they have enough sanity to keep them out of the hands of the truly insane. I'm sure Japan and China will start building nukes too, but I'm figuring they are at least more invested in stablity if not increasingly our capitalistic values.
The approach is not without problems, but some of these problems are likely inevitable over time anyway (the breakup of Iraq, and break-down of non-proliferation). Oh yeah and hundreds of thousands of more dead non-Kurdish Iraqis, but then we've already proven we don't care about that anyway, so why pretend? Yep, its a nasty world and we are part of it.
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I will fight your gods for food, Mo Enzyme
(consolidation of handles: Jake Sapiens; memelab; logicnazi; Loki; Every1Hz; and Shadow)
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