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Memetics and the Modular-Mind
« on: 2003-08-08 13:10:37 » |
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Author: hkhenson Source: alt.memetics Dated: 1997.02.16
This 40k article on memes is one of few I have written in the past 10-15 years not webbed anywhere. It was originally published in _Analog_, August, 1987. A somewhat edited version was reprinted in _Whole Earth Review_, Fall, 1987 (with some great art work). A short version was anthologized in WER _Signals_, (1988?) and about a year later the Reason Foundation sent reprints of the WER version to about half the high schools in the US for debate resource material. [Reason Magazine asked me to write an article on memes which was rejected after they had a management change. That article is widely webbed as "Memes, MetaMemes and Politics."] (Permission is granted to put this and my other articles on web sites.)
Analog anthologized the '87 article (slightly updated) in the 1990 hardback, ANALOG ESSAYS ON SCIENCE, Copyright (c) 1990 by Davis Publications, Inc. For some reason I could not find an electronic copy, and my copy of the (out of print) book has been missing for years. I finally found a library copy and scanned it in. I did not update it because it is of historical interest. A few 1997 comments are in {}, footnotes are in [].
Where it mentions the Soviet Union it is definately of out of date. :-)
H. Keith Henson, Feb. 1997
MEMETICS AND THE MODULAR-MIND
AUGUST 1987
{Lead-in by Stanley Schmidt}
In his Foundation stories, Isaac Asimov proposed a future science called "psychohistory," in which the collective behavior of human populations could be predicted with high precision. In our time, the social sciences are often viewed as sharply different from the physical sciences because they cannot do much predicting. Is this an inherent limitation on the social sciences, or might it be possible to put them on a truly predictive basis by means that have not been formulated yet? There are a number of lines of research suggesting that it might. One of them is based on the "meme": a concept created by analogy with the gene and describing an entity supposed to behave in a somewhat similar way.
H. Keith Henson was one of the founders, and the first president of the L5 Society, which has since become part of the National Space Society. He describes himself as a carrier for several highly infectious memes relating to space colonies, nanotechnolaay, personal computers, and cult-watching.
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SCIENCE fiction writers do not always manage to stay ahead of science. One significant concept showed up in the scientific literature 13 years before Charles Sheffield and Arthur Clarke simultaneously wrote stories that incorporated the "Skyhook" or "Beanstalk." But in projecting a science of social prediction, SF writers have been far ahead of the scientists. Isaac Asimov based the entire Foundation series on "Psychohistory." Robert Heinlein developed the theme of predicting social movement in his Future History stories, especially in Revolt in 2100, Methuselah's Children, and in the unwritten saga of Reverend Nehemiah Scudder.*
[ * "First Prophet," President of the United States, destroyer of its Constitution, and founder of the Theocracy. If this makes you vaguely uncomfortable, it is probably because you have been reading about fundamentalist preacher/presidential candidate Pat Robertson. As the Ayatollah Khomeini recently demonstrated, fundamentalist religion and politics can make a nasty mix.]
Science fiction aside, we don't have a science of social prediction. Until recently, we haven't even had much in the way of theories. Our continual surprise at the development of cults, religions, wars, fads, and other social movements is a notable exception to the steady progress humans have made in building better models of our environment. When you consider the suffering associated with some social movements, our lack of good models must he considered a major deficiency.
A successful theory of the development of social movements will have to provide a unifying theory for events that make up much of the evening news. It will have to discover common features that lie behind the diverse trends causing problems in Nicaragua, South Africa, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East. A good theory should be able to evaluate the danger or lack of danger from the LaRouche organization, whose accidental win in the Democratic primary forced Adlai Stevenson III to run as an independent in the Illinois governor's race. (This cult more recently made the news when the FBI raided its offices in the wake of alleged massive credit card frauds.) It should be able to produce a plausible model for the breakup of the Rajneesh cult (whose Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh accumulated 93 Rolls Royces before abandoning his Oregon community). The theory should be able to predict the conditions under which Turkey will be subverted by a fundamentalist version of Islam similar to that which led to so much grief in Iran.
A tall order! But an emerging field of study, _memetics_, holds just such promise. Sometimes thought of as "germ theory applied to ideas," memetics is an outgrowth of evolutionary biology. It provides models where social movements are seen as side effects of infectious ideas that spread among people in a way mathematically identical to the way epidemic disease spreads. It has been noticed, for example, that use rates for various drugs, most recently "crack," have closely followed epidemic-like curves that seem to be as oblivious to the efforts of authorities as the Black Death was in 1348. At a deeper level, research in neuroscience and artificial intelligence is starting to develop an understanding of why we are susceptible to "infectious information," both the benign and the deadly. As useful as these models may be, they are not without the potential to seriously affect our cherished institutions. A good understanding of the mechanisms of our minds and the dynamics that underlie the spread and persistence of any social or political movement has the potential to forever alter the way we think about all other social movements, including those of our own culture, religions, and nation. When viewed from the perspective of tolerance that has been developing in Western culture since the Renaissance, the changes in outlook seem to be positive, but it would not surprise me to find memetics condemned from the pulpit even more than evolution has been.
Memetics comes from "meme" (which rhymes with "cream"), a word coined in purposeful analogy to gene by Richard Dawkins in his 1976 book, _The Selfish Gene_. To understand memes, you must have a good understanding of the modern concepts of evolution, and this is a good source. In its last chapter, memes were defined as replicating information patterns that use minds to get themselves copied much as a virus uses cells to get itself copied. (Dawkins credits several others for developing the concepts, especially the anthropologist F. T. Cloak.) Like genes, memes are pure information.*
[*The essence of a gene is in its information. It is still a gene "for hemoglobin" or "for waltzing behavior in mice" whether the sequence is coded in DNA, printed on paper, or is written on magnetic tape.]
They must be perceived indirectly, most often by their effect on behavior or by material objects that result from behavior. Humans are not the only creatures that pass memes about. Bird songs that are learned (and subject to variation) and the songs of whales are also replicating information pattern that fit the model of a meme. So is the "termiteing" behavior that chimps pass from generation to generation.
"Meme" is similar to "idea," but not all ideas are memes. A passing idea which you do not communicate to others, or one which fails to take root in others, falls short of being a meme. The important part of the "meme about memes" is that memes are subject to adaptive evolutionary forces very similar to those that select for genes. That is, their variation is subject to selection in the environment provided by human minds, communication channels, and the vast collection of cooperating and competing memes that make up human culture. The analogy is remarkably close. For example, genes in cold viruses that cause sneezes by irritating noses spread themselves by this route to new hosts and become more common in the gene pool of a cold virus. Memes cause those they have successfully infected to spread the meme by both direct methods (proselytizing) and indirect methods (such as writing). Such memes become more common in the culture pool.
The entire topic would be academic except that there are two levels of evolution (genes and memes) involved and the memetic level is only loosely coupled to the genetic. Memes which override genetic survival, such as those which induce young Lebanese Shiites to blow themselves "into the next world" from the front seat of a truck loaded with high explosives, or induce untrained Iranians to volunteer to charge Iraqi machine guns, or the WW II Kamikaze "social movement" in Japan, are all too well known. I have proposed the term "memeoid" for people whose behavior is so strongly influenced by a replicating information pattern (meme) that their survival becomes inconsequential in their own minds.
For a vivid example we can hark back a few years ago to Rev. Jim Jones and the People's Temple incident, where 912 people, including Jones, died of complications--poison and gunshot wounds--induced by an information disease.
The Children's Crusades of the middle ages were larger and more lethal; only 2 of 20,000 returned from one. The mass suicide in the first century by the Jews at Masada is a clear example of information patterns in people's minds having more influence over their behavior than the fear of death.
A more seductive example of a social movement set off by a lethal meme comes from South Africa. In the 1850s, a meme (originally derived from a dream) led to a great sacrifice by the Xhoas people during which they killed their cattle, burned their grain, and refrained from planting in the belief that doing so would cause their ancestors to come back from the dead and expel the whites. At least 20,000 and perhaps as many as 60,000 starved when the predicted millennia of plenty failed to arrive. Known as the Cattle Killing, it was not a unique response for a primitive society being displaced by a more technically advanced one. The "Ghost Dancers" phenomenon among American Indians was a similar response.
Memes that bring about suicidal behavior are at least self-limiting. Those which induce one group of people to kill another are much worse, and the social movements they induce are often much larger. The scope of the social movement known as the Inquisition is seldom mentioned in history textbooks, but:
The number of victims claimed by the witch-hunts, which lasted for three hundred years, is reckoned by historians to be between five and six million people; it therefore caused more deaths than all the wars waged over the period.
It is only when one takes into account the brutal, pitiless, expression of mass-mania, and that a belief in the devil, his traffic with witches and warlocks, was constantly being fanned anew by the Church . . . that it is possible to gain any measure of understanding. . *
[* Five Thousand Years of Medicine by Gerhard Venzrner, Tr. Marion Koenig, Taplinger Publishing Co., NY 1968 pg. 163.]
The depredations and brutality of the Inquisition were about typical of deadly memes stemming from religions or closely related social movements such as Marxist-Leninist communism.
In the last decade, the people of Kampuchea were infected with an anti-intellectual, agrarian utopian meme clearly mutated (in the minds of Pol Pot and his close associates) from the Vietnamese variation of the communist meme. They were Eric Hoffer's "True Believers" of the most extreme stripe. The resulting social movement was a massive self-genocide. Over one third of the population of Kampuchea, including almost all of the city dwellers and the educated, died before the Vietnamese (embarrassed by news stories of rivers clogged with bodies) invaded and put a stop to the killing. Many more would have died had the social movement run its course without interference. Kampuchea will take decades to recover, but "'tis an ill wind ..." The people of Thailand, with a front seat on the slaughter, seem to have lost all sympathy for their own related social movements.
History classes have made us more aware of the genocidal depredations resulting from the "master race" meme that was part of the Nazi meme complex. Considered from the viewpoint of memes, Hitler was less a prime mover than a willing victim of this particularly nasty and pervasive variety of information disease. Had plague struck Germany in the '30s instead of Nazism, we would have understood it in terms of susceptibility, vectors, and disease organisms. What did happen may soon be modeled and understood in terms of the social and economic disruptions of the time increasing the number of people susceptible to fanatical beliefs, just as poor diet is known to increase the number of those susceptible to tuberculosis. For vectors, we have personal contact, the written word, radio, and amplified voices substituting for rats, lice, mosquitoes, and coughed-out droplets. A pool of "sub-memes," many of them ancient myth, contributed to the syncretic Nazi meme in much the same way mobile genes contribute to the virulence of the influenza viruses.
Nazism was not the only fanatical movement growing and evolving in the fertile social media of Germany between the wars. The Marxist-Leninist meme was a visible competitor in the early period. Even though most of those infected with the Nazi meme were conquered or killed and Nazism became a suppressed meme, it cannot be said to have died. As a replicating information pattern that has gone through a great deal of evolutionary honing, it is still successful in infecting a few susceptible people today.
A fascinating footnote to the German experience with Nazism and its horrors happened in 1969 when Ron Jones, a teacher in Palo Alto, exposed a high school history class to an intensive, five-day experience with the ideas that made up the Nazi meme. The experience of that week was originally published as "Take as Directed" in _The CoEvolution Quarterly,_ {later WER} Spring '76 and a few years ago was made into a TV movie, _The Wave_. Over four days, Jones introduced and drilled his students in concepts of Strength Through Discipline, Community, Action, and Pride. (The fifth day was devoted to showing them how easily they had started to slip into the abyss.) The enthusiasm with which most of the class adopted the memes and spread them to their friends, swelling a 40 student class to 200 in 5 days, made it one of the most frightening events the teacher had ever experienced. Given the track record of the Nazi meme, the mini-social movement his experiment set off is no more surprising in retrospect than the medical effects would have been if the teacher had sprayed smallpox virus on the class.
An empirical characteristic of large, long-lived religious movements or related social movements (at least in the West) is a scripture or body of written material. This may function to standardize the meme involved or at least slow its evolution as the number of people infected with it grows. From Scientology right back to the Hindu Vedas, I can think of no counter-examples. Social movements involving more than a few thousand people or lasting more than a few years may have been rare before writing came along.
It is possible that the breakup of the Rajneesh cult was related to its lack of an organized written scripture at a critical juncture. The memes that were the origin of that particular social movement were characterized by considerable instability; that is, parasitic memes arose out of the local culture soup at short intervals. Some of them (tapping phones) made a kind of paranoid sense, but poisoning salad bars at restaurants with Salmonella bacteria in the hope of influencing local elections made no sense. The group seems to have amplified individual crazy impulses at the expense of propagating the meme.
I have noticed several features of the social movements that derived from really dangerous memes. One is self-isolation of the infected group or at least new recruits from the rest of society. This need not be an "intelligent" action taken by the "leaders." There may be no more thought involved than the selection of dark moths in industrial England. The "fanatic cult" memes which incorporate isolation are the ones we observe; those which do not incorporate isolation are like light moths, gone and not observable.
In the case of the Soviet Union, the cult-like communist meme survives in a society largely isolated from the rest of the world. In recent years the isolation may have resulted from reasoned considerations about the fragility of the communist meme in open competition with other memes. A more parsimonious view would note that without originally having a strong isolation component, the communist meme would have had no more social influence in the USSR than it has had in, say, France.*
[* The ferment in the USSR today is certainly consistent with this point.]
Isolation makes possible exposure to a single meme (or meme set) many times a day for months or years without much contact with other memes. Exclusive exposure to one meme (also known as brainwashing) induces a "dependent mental state" in some people.
Thankfully, most of us have not experienced the dependent mental state firsthand, but we have all seen such people on the news programs boarding buses for the front in Iran, or been harassed by them in airports, or had them knock on our doors and try to infect us. It is clear that the people who suffer from extreme cases of "information disease" have lost much of their ability to take care of themselves or their children. Truly dedicated people often fail to replace themselves, since too much of their life energies are channeled into propagating the infecting meme. One example comes from the largest subdivision of Christianity, where celibacy for its most dedicated has long been institutionalized. The Rajneesh cult practiced the opposite of celibacy but discouraged births to the point of sterilizing the barely pubescent female children of its resident members.
Given that memes have been interfering with our reproduction for a long time, one must wonder why humans are still so susceptible to information diseases. The answers to such questions are starting to come from research in artificial intelligence (AI), neuroscience, and archeology. It is becoming apparent that our vulnerabilities are a direct consequence of the way our minds are organized, and that organization is a direct consequence of our evolutionary history.
Marvin Minsky (a principal founder of Al) and Michael Gazzaniga (one of the major workers in split-brain research) have independently come to a virtually identical model of the mind. Both view minds as vast collections of interacting, largely parallel (co-conscious) modules, or "agents." The lowest level of such a society of agents consists of a small number of nerve cells that innervate a section of muscle. A few of the higher level modules have been isolated in clever experiments by Gazzaniga, some of them on split-brain patients.
One surprise from this work is that we seem to have our mental modules arranged in a way that guarantees we will form beliefs. What we believe in depends, at least in part, on what we are exposed to and the order in which we are exposed. Gazzaniga argues that we slowly evolved the ability to form beliefs because the ability provides a major advantage in surviving. Being able to infer, that is to form new beliefs, and to learn, in the sense of acquiring such beliefs from others, was a major advance over learning by trial and error. Being able to pass the rare new ways our ancestors found for chipping rock or making pots from person to person and generation to generation was vital in allowing humans to spread over the earth. But as this ability became the norm, communicating human minds formed a new "primal soup" in which a new kind of non-biological evolution, that of replicating information patterns or memes, could get started. A wide variety of competing memes has evolved in the intervening seventy thousand years or so. It should not be surprising that the survivors of this process, like astrology or religions, are so effective at inducing their hosts to spread and defend them. It is also plausible that in the tens of millennia since memetic evolution became a major factor, there has been a biological co-evolution. The parts of our brains that hold our belief systems have probably undergone biological adaptation to be better at detecting dangerous memes and more skeptical about memes that result in death or seriously interfere with reproductive success.
This type of co-evolution is known as an "arms race" to biologists. One such biological arms race has resulted in almost perfect egg mimicry by the cuckoo and in correspondingly sharp visual discrimination in the birds it parasitizes. By analogy, while we get better at spotting dangerous memes, the memes may be evolving to be more effective at infecting us. Advancing technology (which itself is an improving collection of memes) changes the environmental conditions where memes survive or fail as well. The modern telephone system and the tape cassette player were major factors in the takeover of Iran. It has been argued that the rise of the Nazis depended strongly on radio reaching a previously unexposed and unsophisticated population. Exposure to modern advertising may be one factor which makes a television broadcast by Lyndon LaRouche attacking (among others) the L5 Society so absurd that tapes of it are used as entertainment at L5 parties. He might have been taken seriously in the '3Os.
I have picked dangerous examples for vivid illustrations and to point out that memes have a life of their own. The ones that kill their hosts make this hard to ignore. However, most memes, like most microorganisms, are either helpful or at least harmless. Some may even provide a certain amount of defense from the very harmful ones. It is the natural progression of parasites to become symbiotes, and the first symbiotic behavior that emerges in a proto-symbiote is for it to start protecting its host from other parasites. I have come to appreciate the common religions in this light. Even if they were harmful when they started, the ones that survive over generations evolve and do not cause too much damage to their hosts. Calvin (who had dozens of people executed over theological disputes) would hardly recognize Presbyterians three hundred years later. Contrariwise, the Shaker meme is now confined to books, and the Shakers are gone. It is clearly safer to believe in a well-aged religion than to be susceptible to a potentially fatal cult.
History doesn't change, but our interpretation of it can. For example, the contemporary "causes" of historical epidemics (such as the miasma theory) have been totally supplanted by germ theory explanations. Before germ theory came along, memes of causality for epidemics were remarkably stable. The "explanation" for the Black Death of 1348 was still in use for the Philadelphia Yellow Fever epidemic of 1796. Similarly, various "explanations" for wars have been with us for hundreds of years.
Memetics provides an interesting alternate way to analyze recent wars and the roots of current disputes. In this view, the ultimate (though unaware) protagonists of World War II were memes such as the Nazi "master race" and the Marxist-Leninist meme (MLM). The current clash between the Soviets and the western world can be viewed as a meme conflict (for space in minds) between the religion-like, competition-intolerant mono-meme of communism and the western meta-meme of tolerance. While it is not a religion by any reasonable definition, the Marxist-Leninist meme is clearly in competition for the "belief space" in minds usually occupied by religious memes. It, and its more cultish offshoots, have the typical virtues and excesses of cult-stage religious memes. In an amusing twist, the "god-less" communist meme is the more religion-like of the two in its battle for mind space with secular western culture!
Reviewers of an earlier draft of this article objected to my description of Soviet memes. Words like "tolerant" or "intolerant" have acquired a great deal of positive/negative connotation in the western world, but in describing memes, I am using them in the same way we would say that a mold colony is intolerant of a bacterial invasion. With respect to the belief system that dominates the meme pool of the other superpower, I am trying to be descriptive, not partisan. If anything, I would think that understanding the memetic nature of religions and related movements like communism would defuse the emotional connections and substitute something closer to dispassionate understanding of the parasitic-to-symbiotic memes behind such social movements. It has had that effect on me. Many, even the most gruesome, features of communism are what they are simply because those features were (and are) necessary for the meme to exist in a world of competing memes. Isolation, for example, is a common feature of virtually all successful religious memes while they are in the cult stage. Anyone who has studied history knows that suppression of competitive memes by the power of the state is a common experience once a meme of this class has infected the leaders or they have been replaced by those infected.
And if the Christian religion was a mainstay of the aristocracy, serving to keep the peasants in place, Soviet Communism is no less supportive of its own hereditary elite. As a successful and persistent meme, that has appeal even to people who know the realities of its practice, it commands a certain grudging respect. From a meme's viewpoint, tolerance of other memes is not a virtue; it is, in fact, a fatal characteristic for a particular meme, as memes inducing intolerance to other memes would soon displace it. On the other hand, a meta-meme of limited toleration, even cooperation among memes is possible. The western metamere of tolerance seems to have emerged from an ecosystem of memes in much the same way that cooperative behavior has been modeled as emerging from an ecosystem of individuals.* In the area of meme tolerance the western world may be unique. We think of censorship as evil; where but in an advanced ecosystem of memes could such a strange idea have emerged?
[* See _The Evolution of Cooperation_ by Robert Axelrod, 1984 Basic Books, NY. ]
I have recently had a lot of fun reading history to trace the development of the meta-meme of tolerance. This particular character of our ecosystem of memes has been developing at least since the writings of the Greeks and Romans were a rediscovered during the Renaissance. Studying inactive pagan religions may have been the first step in developing tolerance for a variety of religious memes. The fragmentation of the dominant religion during the Reformation led to a series of largely indecisive religious wars in most of the major countries of Europe. Sheer exhaustion may have been one of the most significant factors in developing a grudging tolerance, which in these later times has taken on a patina of virtue in the division of our culture known as "liberal."
In this view, western culture is a vast ecosystem where memes of many classes engage in "fair" competition with each other. Attempts to subvert fair competition by changing laws or education (such as introducing "creation science" into schools) draw opposition from defenders of a wide variety of memes which have evolved within this environment. This model may provide testable explanations for both western culture's tolerance of intolerant memes (such as creation science and the MLM) and the hostility these memes evoke from various segments of the culture. David Brin's "Dogma of Otherness" in the April 1986 Analog prompted considering a memetic explanation for such peculiar ambiguities in our culture.
Several current social movements are obvious candidates for examination with memetic theory. Given the available data, we may be able to predict the remaining course of the "non-literate graffiti epidemic," which has spread in the past 15 years from New York City to remote corners of the country. There are substantial financial reasons (such as the cost of mark-resistant walls) to want to know if scribbler behavior will be a limited epidemic or will become an endemic part of our culture.
Drug use, clearly a replicating pattern of behavior passed from person to person, is another "social movement" where the similarity to epidemic waxing and waning has been widely used by reporters, and noted without much explanation in a number of learned journals. If it were formally considered as an epidemic with memes as the infecting agents, the ways by which the behavior spreads might get more attention. Counter-drug programs might be evaluated in terms of how well they induce reasonable behavior. Some efforts in the past, especially those which wildly exaggerated the dangers of a drug such as marijuana, may have increased the behavior of taking other drugs. These efforts may have immunized those exposed against believing any official pronouncements about drugs.
Formal consideration of drug use as an epidemic of meme-induced behavior might also lead to the realization that the percentage of people susceptible to abusing most drugs is not all that large. (Cigarette smoking is an exception.) For example, most of the people I know who have tried cocaine don't care for it. Not liking the effect, they wouldn't use it if it were free. People who really like opiates aren't that common, either.
Part of my interest in memes stems from a ten-year (and continuing) experience of being infected with the space colony meme which developed in the minds of Gerard O'Neill and his students in the late '60s. (See "Memes, L5 and the Religion of the Space Colonies," September, 1985 and "More on Memes," June 1986, both in _L5 News_.) Memetics provides candidate explanations for why the space colony meme spread in the first place, why it is not making much progress now, and some insight into what might be done to revitalize the meme and actually accomplish the implicit goals.
From a recent survey of L5 members, there seems to be two main factors and a minor one that contributed to the attractiveness of the space colony meme. First was the "new lands" factor. We are the genetic and memetic heirs of people who moved into vacant areas of the planet. It should be no surprise that the prospect of new lands is an irresistible attraction to many people. This may also explain the higher than proportional membership in L5 from California, where the last of the restless pioneers piled up. The minor factor (suggested by Dale Skran of Bell Labs) is fear of random events such as nuclear war, asteroid impact, worldwide epidemics, or crazy social movements that could badly damage civilization or even extinguish human life. As Heinlein put it, one planet is too fragile a basket to put all the human eggs in. The other main factor was possibility of personal involvement, of going into space. Surprisingly this is still a very important factor. Some 60 percent of respondents to a survey at the 1986 L5 annual conference said they expected to live in space.
If the attractiveness of the space colony meme is in the prospect of large numbers of people being able to live in space within a short time, these factors are quite at variance with today's reality; since the Solar Power Satellite project bit the dust, there haven't even been any widely accepted proposals that would get us out there in the next 50-100 years. Since the space colony meme never had a fixed deadline, the lack of correspondence between the meme and reality hasn't hit as hard as "the day after" hits a millennial religion, but informal surveys of former members indicate that lack of a timetable was an important factor in their becoming inactive. If we want to get out there, we need to tap a very large source of social energy. The biggest single source of social energy on the planet is the meme conflict between the MLM and the western metamere. There are ways this might be tapped to get us into space, but that would take another article.
The memes which embody the germ theory of disease emerged when they did partly b&cause "the time was right." The work of von Leeuwenheok, Semmelweis, Spallanzani, and their less remembered colleagues established in scientific culture the background memes about microorganisms. Without these cooperating memes, the ideas of Pasteur and Koch could not have replicated. The tragic history of Semmelweis and his statistical work on childbed fever stands as an example of the failure of a meme to take root in a culture before the conditions are right for its spread, no matter how true or useful to humans it may be.
If most conflict in the world is an indirect effect of memes, memetics holds as much potential for reducing human misery as the germ theory of disease. Just being able to model the interaction between the Soviets and the West in terms of memes might go a long way toward making the world a safer place. It took at least 60 years for the germ theory of disease to be widely accepted, though, as anyone who has traveled much knows, it still has a ways to go in many parts of the world. What are the prospects in the near future for a similar acceptance of the meme-about-memes? If it were widely accepted, what changes could we expect to see analogous to public health? Would widespread awareness of infectious information make us less susceptible to dangerous memes? Can we separate ourselves from the memes that possess us?
Further exploration of the analogy between replicating information patterns and the ecosystems-epidemic models biologists have painstakingly developed for other purposes may provide badly needed insight into the origin and courses of social movements and the nature of meme competition/cooperation. If memetics develops soon enough, it may provide help in evaluating proposed solutions to current international problems, predict the course of troublesome social movements, and suggest solutions for conflicts between social movements. If this article succeeds in infecting you with the meme-about-memes, perhaps it will help you be more responsible about the memes you spread and less likely to be infected by a meme that can harm you or those around you.
POSTSCRIPT 1989
Lyndon Larouche has now been sent to jail for credit card fraud. Cults such as this one can almost be defined by the central meme gaining ascendency in the minds of the infected over all other considerations, moral and legal.
Computer viruses are an additional analogy to the more destructive memes. While memes infect _human_ operating systems, computer viruses and worms infect _computer_ operating systems
Sadly, the meme-about-memes is not spreading as fast as I would like. Those interested in helping spread it can contact me at:
{1997 updated address} P.O. Box 60012 Palo Alto, CA 94306
or through email at:
hkhenson@netcom.com or keith@xanadu.com
{Additional articles include Memes, MetaMemes and Politics, A Theoretical Understanding (memes and cryonics), one on meme trapping of leaders, and a recent one on a connection between cults and evolutionary psychology}
REFERENCES
In addition to Dawkins's '76 and '82 books, there are a number of books and articles directly discussing memes. One that reached a large number of readers was Douglas Hofstadter's Metamagical Themas column "On Viral Sentences and Self-Replicating Structures" in Scientific American (Jan. 1983) and reprinted in his recent book. There are numerous supporting sources, and a reliable source indicates that a journal of memetics may be offered soon.
Bohannan, Paul. "The Gene Pool and the Meme Pool," Science 80, November 1980, pp. 25, 28.
Cloak, F.T. , Jr. "The Causal Logic of Natural Selection: A General Theory," Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology 3, article 6, 1986. In press. Preprints available from F.T. Cloak, Jr., 1613 Fruit Avenue, NW, Albuquerque, NM 87104.
Dawkins, Richard. The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as the Unit of Selection. W.H. Freeman and Company, Oxford and San Francisco, 1982. See esp. Chapter 6, pp. 97-117.
Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, New York, 1976. See Chapter 11, first use of "meme."
Drexler, K. Eric. Engines of Creation. Anchor Press/Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1986. See esp. pp.35-38 and other references to "memes" in the index.
Henson, H. Keith.
"Memes, L5 and the Religion of the Space Colonies," L-5 News, September, 1985.
"More on Memes," L-5 News, June 1986.
"Memes, Mental Parasites, and the Evolution of Skepticism," unpublished monograph.
"Original Sin and Liberal Guilt," Cryonics, in press. {on the web}
Hofstadter, Douglas R. Metamagical Themas. Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1985. See esp. Chapter 3, pp. 49-69.
Stefik, Mark. "The Next Knowledge Medium," The AI Magazine, Spring 1986, Vol.7, #1.
Wilson, Edward o. and Charles J. Lumsden. Genes, Mind and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981. See esp. Chapter 3 and earlier definitions of "culturgen" and "epigenesis."
The following works do not use the word "meme," but their contents help elucidate human behavior and cultural evolution.
Baker, Sherry. "A Plague Called Violence," Omni, Vol.8, No.11 (August 1986), pp 42ff.
Chase, Stuart. The Tyranny of Words. Harcourt, Brace and World; New York, 1938.
Cloak, F.T., Jr., et al. "The Adaptive Significance of Cultural Behavior: Comments and Reply," Human Ecology, Vol.5, No.1(1977), pp.49-50 (with references appended to the monograph).
Cloak, F.T., Jr., "Is a Cultural Ethology Possible?," Human Ecology, Vol.3, No.3 (1975), pp.161-82.
Conway, Flo and Jim Siegelman. Snapping. Dell Publishing, New York, 1979.
Gazzaniga, Michael S. The Social Brain: Discovering the Networks of the Mind. Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1985.
Kelly, Kevin. "Information as a Communicable Disease," CoEvolution Quarterly, Summer 1984.
Minsky, Marvin. Society of Mind. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986.
Nisbett, Richard, and Lee Ross. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980.
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