From: Mermaid (hidden@lucifer.com)
Date: Sat Oct 18 2003 - 21:04:14 MDT
[quote from: rhinoceros on 2003-10-18 at 12:56:23]
[Kharin]Ostrom argued that problems of the kind Hardin described can be solved by alternative means than privatization or centralization, such as “polycentric” governance systems, in which central authorities provide broad enforcement, but let local communities set their own rules as much as possible. For example, problems of overfishing of lobsters along the Maine coast have been solved by allowing local lobster fishermen to informally regulate certain parts of the coast, working in conjunction with the state government.
[rhinoceros]
This seems reasonable, and I would vote for some kind of \"complementarity principle\" as well. But how exactly can such administrative measures address the problem of the commons? Hmm... is it about creating groups small enough to watch their members and to personally feel the consequences of the actions of others in their commons? A kind of defensive partial collectivization?
[Mermaid]The lobster conservation efforts in Maine along with the lobster fishermen is loosely based on Japan's Fisheries co-operative Associations. The idea itself is several hundreds of years old. Basically, the Fisheries co-operative Association owns all the fishing rights of the sea. The fishing grounds is *private* property and is no longer the "commons". There are many FCAs and fishing rights can be purchased by individual fishermen/company only if they belong to one of the several FCAs. The Japanese FCA model is nothing but conservation through privatisation because the ocean is considered as private property just as land is considered as private property that can be owned, sold, purchased, leased and utilised for productive purposes.
The Maine Lobster co-management is rather successful, but I am not sure it is the same as the Japanese FCA model as the ocean is still not the private property of any of these lobster fishermen. There is less structure and even less control for it to be accepted as a valid solution to the tragedy of the commons or lobster fishing grounds, in this case. Co-management instead of privatisation(as with Japanese FCAs) will probably have to deal with a lot more conflict as there is no clear cut idea as to the authority or ownership or even accountability. Here loosely formed fishermen groups co-operate and co-manage on issues such as setting a limit to the number of traps, how many traps a particular lobster fisherman can set in x number of months etc. The govt itself does not have any jurisdiction over the oceans or the fishing grounds. Its basically agreeing upon figures and limitations set by a group of people with the blessings of the govt. It might sound cynical, but its nothing more than the lobster industry
protecting itself from outsiders. It still doesnt really tackle the tragedy of the commons scenario because there is still no "loss" in an economic sense for any individual lobster fisherman if he breaks any of the imposed rules. Take the Japanese FCA as an example...just as with ..say agricultural land... there is a definite monetary loss for the one who holds the ownership title if there is over use of the resouce...this loss translates into sensible limits on overusing a particular resource...so...privatisation helps to curtail the abuse of the oceans and hence prevents the tragedy of the commons.
---- This message was posted by Mermaid to the Virus 2003 board on Church of Virus BBS. <http://virus.lucifer.com/bbs/index.php?board=54;action=display;threadid=29549> --- To unsubscribe from the Virus list go to <http://www.lucifer.com/cgi-bin/virus-l>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Oct 18 2003 - 21:04:49 MDT