From: L' Ermit (lhermit@hotmail.com)
Date: Tue Mar 05 2002 - 13:03:48 MST
[b][u]Virian Ethics: The Soul in the Machine and the Question of Virian
Ethics.[/u][/b]
[hr][b][u]URL:[/u][/b][url]http://virus.lucifer.com/bbs/index.php?board=32&action=display&threadid=11530&start=0
[hr][b][u]Authors:[/u][/b] Hermit
[hr][b][u]Revision:[/u][/b] 1 (Full mark-up)
[hr][b][u]Author’s notes for revision:[/u][/b] 1
This is intended to serve as an introduction to a discussion which will
occur over a series of posts and hopefully discussion under the general
heading “Virian Ethics: Whatever” Virians are requested to begin their
responses and comments on this post in this way, so as to allow easy
identification of such posts in the archives.
[hr][b][u]Status[/u][/b]
This is an introductory version of this document, intended to lead to a
series of documents on ethics and morality, in order to stimulate discussion
on this topic with a view to further development of a Virian ethic. Comments
and corrections are requested.
[hr][b][u]Abbreviated Copyright Notice[/u][/b]
Copyright (C) The Church of Virus, 2002. All rights reserved. Unlimited
distribution permitted in accordance with the terms of the [i]Full copyright
notice[/i] below.
[hr][b][u]Abstract[/u][/b]
Morals are “inherited”, ethics are considered. Ethics trump morals. This
introductory article attempts to contrast “mundane morality” with “Virian
ethics”, which I am going to suggest “should” be rational, intentional, and
based on “memetic” principles. I will suggest that “morality” is out of
place in a rational life, and that the deliberate application of ethics is
required to produce results which, while they may appear “merely moral”, are
in fact greatly superior to the “morality” espoused by the general
population. A rational ethical stance allows the Virian to develop an
appropriate response to unusual situations when the old “rule-of-thumb”
morality inherited from our societies fails completely. This leads to the
conclusion that the soul in the machine, or a spirothetic consciousness may
be as valuable, perhaps more valuable, than a human.
[hr][b][u]1 Introduction[/u][/b]
1.1 Given the Virian’s rational refusal to accept dogma, including dogma
dictated by a particular society or individuals, we are left asking where
our source of “morality” originates and indeed whether it is possible for a
Virian to be “moral”.
1.2 To begin with, we need to determine the nature of morals and ethics are.
Morality refers to the first-order beliefs about good and evil by means of
which some people believe that their behavior is guided. Ethics relate to
the second-order, reflective explicit, philosophical consideration of
so-called moral beliefs and practices.
1.3 The difference between ethics and morality is like the difference
between musicology and music. Ethics is a conscious stepping back and
reflecting on morality, just as musicology is a conscious reflection on
music. Another analogy, which is sometimes made, is that the difference
between ethics and morality is similar to the difference between a physicist
and an engineer. The engineer has practical “rules of thumb” which he can
apply to most situations – and in most situations, these “rules of thumb”
will provide adequate results. The physicist may also have rules of thumb
allowing a rough-take, but may also revert to first principles to determine
what is right – and in so doing can develop new rules of thumb. Rules of
thumb are generally more useful and qualitatively better suited to everyday
life than either complex systems of rules or “gut-feel”, as with practice,
they will be used as a matter of habit even when there is no time for
complex analysis, and will generally give better results than “gut feel.”
However, unless the “rules of thumb” are grounded in solid reasoning and
consistently yield reasonable results, it may be that they are worse than no
rules at all. We shall, in the course of these essays, examine some existing
systems to determine whether this is the case.
1.4 The field of ethics, also called moral philosophy, involves
systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong
behavior. Ethical theories are divided into three general subject
areas:[list]
[b]1.4.1 Metaethics[/b] investigates where our ethical principles come from,
and what they mean. Are they “merely” social inventions? Do they involve
more than expressions of our individual emotions?
[b]1.4.2 Normative ethics[/b] involves a more practical task, which is to
arrive at standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. Ideally, “moral”
questions can be answered by consulting the “moral guidelines” provided by
“normative theories”.
[b]1.4.3 Applied ethics[/b] involves examining specific controversial
issues, using the conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics to
attempt to resolve controversial issues.[/list]
1.5 The lines of distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and
applied ethics are often blurry and it is our intention to preserve this
state, while attempting to avoid descending into morality or the
disintegration of criticism.
[hr][b][u]2 Metaethics[/u][/b][list]
[b]2.1 The Source and meaning of Morality[/b]
2.1.1 Mankind has worried at the problems of morality and ethics since the
beginnings of recorded history, but in real life, the problem has tended to
be resolved by reference to cultural norms, sometimes justified by recourse
to law, but more usually because “the gods said so.” Of course, this leads
to the attitude that the believers in Judeo-Christian derived religions
(particularly Islam), and far too many Americans hold, which is that an
atheist, not having an absolute system of morality, cannot be moral. This
would surely suggest that, as all Virians are atheists, that all Virians are
immoral.
2.1.2 While one could argue, that given that there is no believable record
of any god having spoken to anyone at anytime, we can take “the gods” as
being the priests speaking on behalf of a particular society and thus not
very different from “the law says so”, but as we shall see in one of the
latter essays, this would not fully address the issue, because a “moral
system” must stand or fall on its own, rather than because of its source.
2.1.3 We can understand this more clearly when we ask the question, as
Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987) attempted to do, of where and when “moral
thinking” originates. He presented his subjects with a series of moral
dilemmas, such as whether it is permissible to steal food to feed one's
starving family. He then noted the reasoning his subjects used in justifying
their particular decisions. Kohlberg concluded that there are five levels of
moral development that people go through. In the first stage, starting at
about age ten, people avoid breaking moral rules to avoid punishment. In the
second stage, people follow moral rules only when it is to their advantage.
In the third stage, starting about age 17, people try to live up to what is
expected of them in small social groups, such as families. In the fourth
stage, people fulfill the expectations of larger social groups, such as
obeying laws that keep society together. In the fifth and final stage,
starting at about age 24, people are guided by both absolute and relative
moral principles; they follow these for altruistic reasons, though, and not
because of what they might gain individually. According to Kohlberg, few
people ever reach this level. Noteworthy that he effectively confirms that
an “innate” sense of morality does not exist, that it is, in so far as it
exists at all, cultured into people rather than bred into them.
2.1.4 His studies also point to the greatest weakness in “common morality,”
the fact that people today imagine that it is “given to them” by their gods
means that they are not trained to consider what is handed to them as a
“moral law” but instead tend to follow blindly what they manage to pick up
for themselves, and so are left with a legalistically oriented hodge-podge
generally justifying that which they have been raised with, and conferring
the power to condemning morals which appear to differ. This is not a very
good basis to build an ethical system, as the law merely tends to be the
formulation of the particular prejudices of a particular society at a
particular time. A moment’s consideration will show that this is not a very
controversial position – it is proverbial that the law is frequently an ass,
and never more spectacularly than when an outdated law is dredged up to
prosecute a specific case long after society has abandoned the situation or
mores when the law was required. Refer e.g.
[url=http://www.worthlessfacts.com/facts.cfm?ParentCatID=9]Strange Laws.
Accessed 2002-02-04[/url]
[b]2.2 The Source of Ethics and Meaning of Ethics[/b]
2.2.1 While ethics can and have been argued on the basis of various “divine
injunctions,” to an atheist, this makes no sense at all. Indeed, to anyone
rational looking at such ethical systems, it is immediately apparent that
the gods worshipped by most people are as petty and prejudiced as their
followers. Not a particularly comforting thought.
2.2.2 So abandoning divinity we can search for other reasons for a
particular ethical stance. Again, this is a well-trodden path. We know that
“do as you would be done by”, better known as “The Golden Rule” is not good
enough, the person being done over might not agree with your opinions (refer
e.g.
[url=ftp://ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/etext93/wman10.txt]“Story of
the Widow's Son in ‘What is man? And other essays of Mark Twain’”, Mark
Twain[/url] and appended to this document).
2.2.3 We might base a rational approach to ethics based on genetic
similarity in defining “like us” for the purpose of making ethical decisions
and such a conclusion, derived from a meta study of ethics, might be that
our treatment of people should to some extent extend from those “most like
ourselves” to those “least like ourselves” and that this aligns well with
human behavior. Few would argue that we do not have a greater responsibility
to our children than we do to a cockroach or prion. Unfortunately, even in
recent history, the Ottomans (viz Armenia), Stalin (e.g. Georgia and
Tajikistan), Hitler (Gypsies and Jews) and the USA (e.g. Iraq) have proved
fairly conclusively that genetics fail us when they are too narrowly
defined, allowing us to conclude that a “people like me” approach does not
work very well when the world is as small today as it has become while Utism
continues to dominate international (and to a large extent, interpersonal)
relationships.
2.2.4 In addition, nobody even slightly empathetic is likely to agree with
an animal having to suffer unnecessarily even when they rationally hold that
it is better for an animal to suffer than a person (and some even disagree
with that). What happens when a hypothetical spirothetic “neural network” is
“tortured”? Would this be ethical? At what point of consciousness in an
artificial life form would torture cease to be ethical – if at any point?
2.2.5 I would like to suggest that the clue lies in the last paragraph. I
would suggest that it is in similarity of thought process and of meme that
we must now draw our basis for ethical decisions. So perhaps human,
non-human genetics becomes less of a distinction than how a particular
consciousness thinks, and what it thinks.[/list]
[hr][b][u]3 Normative ethics[/u][/b]
[b]3.1 Right and wrong conduct[/b][list]
3.1.1 Let us turn our attention to observationally (principally biological)
based principles (Refer Section 4, Observations). These observations create
a bolus of "what is" in a biological sense. Any hypothesis or conclusions we
draw should be consistent with the above observations or be identified as a
conflict between what is and what should (or ought) to be done. Such a
conflict must be extremely solidly grounded or the ethics we promote will
create a tension which will lead to unhappiness - identified in section 4.7
as a being biologically unsupportable.[/list]
[i]On the one hand:[/i][list]
3.1.2 When we examine ethical systems in isolation from what we are, we run
into the danger of rapidly removing ourselves from reality by ignoring "what
we are" when determining "what we should do." The primary reason for this is
the vast range of "what we are" and the secondary reason being our ease of
justifying positions, even when these are positions in opposition to "human
nature". Whatever that may be. And herein lies a vicious problem. Even when
similar, every person is different and attaches different values to things.
Thus any consensus statement about values or ethical systems will tend
towards the rather unuseful generalized platitude - or will require fencing
about to limit the scope of applicability. Attempts to become more specific
will generate more heat than light.[/list]
[i]And on the other hand: [/i][list]
3.1.3 In view of the above, perhaps we should ask two kinds of questions
without differentiating between them. Questions of the classes of [b]"why do
we do?"[/b], and [b]"what ought we to do?"[/b]. I suggest this largely
because it is difficult to achieve conviction that there is a meaningful
line between them. We work the way we do for many reasons and have
conceptions of what we ought to do which are very much related to the way we
function. People from different communities have very different views of
“do’s” and “ought’s” - yet within communities these tend to be closely
aligned. While differentiation may be useful, we might only introduce this
if it seems necessary.[/list]
[i]A resolution? [/i][list]
3.1.4 The above dichotomy may be resolvable by attempting to discover a
biological justification for the establishment of a general principle and
then extending from this into more specific systems until an ethos, which we
can agree is rational, has been developed. The areas where we have
difficulty may then be explored and restricted until we isolate areas of
difficulty and can examine them clearly. This would clearly conform to the
Descartian principles of investigation.[/list]
[hr][b][u]4 Observations: [/u][/b][list]
4.1 We exist.[/list]
4.2 Perception of Others[list]
4.2.1 We are descended from "pack" animals, having affiliation directly
dependent on the strength of our perception of others being "most like"
ourselves.
4.2.2 Appearance is important in determining those "like ourselves".
4.2.3 Ideas are useful to assist us in identifying those "like ourselves".
4.2.4 Ideas may be more important than appearance in identifying those "like
ourselves".[/list]
4.3 Preservation[list]
4.3.1 We attempt to preserve ourselves and distribute our genes.
4.3.2 We attempt to preserve our packs and distribute our packs genes in
preference to those of other packs.
4.3.3 We attempt to preserve and distribute our ideas. [/list]
4.4 Subordination of Preservation[list]
4.4.1 The urge for self-preservation may be subordinated to the
dissemination of our genes.
4.4.2 The urge for self-preservation may be subordinated to the
dissemination of our ideas.
4.4.3 The urge for self-preservation may be subordinated to the interests of
our pack. [/list]
4.5 Reproduction[list]
4.5.1 We reproduce.
4.5.2 When we reproduce we are disseminating our genes.
4.5.3 When we reproduce we are creating opportunities to disseminate our
ideas.[/list]
4.6 Dependency[list]
4.6.1 All life is to a greater or lesser interdependent.
4.6.2 It is frequently the case that we are dependent on other life even
where the dependency is not self-evident.[/list]
4.7 Happiness[list]
4.7.1 Happy people are more effective and accomplish the above better than
sad people.
4.7.2 Happiness is a function of self-perception and
group-acceptance/interaction.[/list]
[hr][b][u]5 Applied ethics[/u][/b]
[b]6 Living Right[/b]
[i]7 Ethical Requisites: [/i][list]
7.1 We should care for ourselves
7.2 We should care or others on a continuum from where we care for them as
much (or more) as we care for ourselves to where we could care less, based
on our identification of closeness.
7.3 We should recognize that ideas are more important than appearance in
determining closeness.
7.4 We should recognize that where we have a short life, our ideas can last
for much longer than our lives.
7.5 We should weight ideas as being more worthy of protection than even
survival of the self.
7.6 We should differentiate between "doing good" and "not doing harm" The
former is active, the latter passive.
7.7 We should differentiate between those "in our pack" and those "outside
our pack" when evaluating actions.[/list]
[hr][b][u]8 Ethical Basis:[/u][/b][list]
“Respecting” implies being true to or preserving. Attempting to order "doing
good"[list]
8.1 respecting our ideas
8.2 respecting "our pack's" ideas
8.3 respecting the ideas of others not in "our pack"
8.4 distributing our ideas
8.5 distributing "our pack's" ideas
8.6 distributing the ideas of others not in "our pack"
8.7 preserving ourselves
8.8 preserving "our pack"
8.9 distributing our genes
8.10 distributing "our pack's" genes
8.11 preserving others not in "our pack"
8.12 distributing the genes of others not in "our pack"[/list][/list]
[hr][b][u]9 Ethical Principles: [/u][/b][list]
9.1 If no good can be done, then we should avoid doing harm.
9.2 If harm must be done, then it should be minimized.
9.3 Good and harm should be measured in terms of the greatest good for the
greatest number (ordered by closeness to those like ourselves).
9.4 We are individually entirely responsible for our own ethics and this
responsibility cannot be divested to another or a group.
9.5 Where the target of a potential ethical action is able to communicate,
the communications of the target should be given precedence over our
ideas.[list]
9.5.1 This does not imply that we should act contrary to our interests
(ideas, distribution, preservation), although this could be considered if
the cost to our interests is deemed low and the benefit to the target deemed
high.
9.5.2 Where the target of a potential ethical action is unable to
communicate, the ethical action should be evaluated according to our own
interests and weighted as denoted above as if we were the target of the
potential ethical action.
9.5.3 As we are able to rationalize any action, it behooves us to not act
rather than act in the event that a situation is unclear, and to require a
clear and present danger before taking any action, which would lead to the
injury or perception of injury of another.[/list]
9.6 Examining the "idea infection" situation under these rules means that if
you are asked to stop, that you must stop. (I don't want to listen to you.)
9.7 If you are asked to participate in an action you deem wrong that you are
free to decline. ("Beat me please." "No." is acceptable. "Yes" may be
acceptable if "No" causes a greater harm, but the harm to self is an
intrinsic part of the decision).
9.8 If you engage in an action, which could injure another, that you should
have a "greater cause." The "greater cause" can only be a danger or injury
which when weighted according to the above criteria outweighs the injury,
which must be done to avoid the “greater harm”.
9.9 Having committed to a course of action, then other rational people may
depend on that commitment in order to make their own decisions. This implies
that having made a commitment, that we should endeavor to adhere to it. (My
"yes" means "yes", and my "no" means "no").
9.10 Having committed to a course of action, you are correct in withdrawing
from that commitment if, at any time, it becomes apparent that more harm
will be done by continuing that action than will be caused by withdrawing
from that action.[/list]
[hr][b][u]Full Copyright Statement[/u][/b]
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[hr][b][u]Acknowledgements[/u][/b]
Discussions with Joe Dees and other members of the CoV.
[hr][b][u]Bibliography[/u][/b]
[url=http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/ethics.htm]The Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. Accessed 2002-02-04[/url]
[url=ftp://sailor.gutenberg.org/pub/gutenberg/etext93/wman10.txt]“Story of
the Widow's Son in ‘What is man? And other essays of Mark Twain’”, Mark
Twain[/url].
[hr][b][u]Story of the Widow's Son in ‘What is man? And other essays of Mark
Twain’[/u][/b]
[url=ftp://ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/etext93/wman10.txt]“Story of
the Widow's Son in ‘What is man? And other essays of Mark Twain’”, Mark
Twain[/url].
[b]Old Man:[/b] I will tell you a little story:
Once upon a time an infidel was guest in the house of a Christian widow
whose little boy was ill and near to death. The infidel often watched by the
bedside and entertained the boy with talk, and he used these opportunities
to satisfy a strong longing in his nature - that desire which is in us all
to better other people’s condition by having them think as we think. He was
successful. But the dying boy, in his last moments, reproached him and said:
“[b]I believed, and was happy in it; you have taken my belief away, and my
comfort. Now I have nothing left, and I die miserable; for the things which
you have told me do not take the place of that which I have lost.[/b]”
And the mother, also, reproached the Infidel, and said: “[b]My child is
forever lost, and my heart is broken. How could you do this cruel thing?
We have done you no harm, but only kindness; we made our house your home,
you were welcome to all we had, and this is our reward. [/b]”
The heart of the infidel was filled with remorse for what he had done, and
he said: “[b]It was wrong--I see it now; but I was only trying to do him
good. In my view he was in error; it seemed my duty to teach him the
truth.[/b]”
Then the mother said: “[b]I had taught him, all his little life, what I
believed to be the truth, and in his believing faith both of us were happy.
Now he is dead, - and lost; and I am miserable. Our faith came down to us
through centuries of believing ancestors; what right had you, or any one, to
disturb it? Where was your honor, where was your shame? [/b]”
[b]Young Man:[/b] He was a miscreant, and deserved death!
[b]Old Man:[/b] He thought so himself, and said so.
[b]Young Man:[/b] Ah - you see, [b]His conscience was awakened!![/b]
[b]Old Man:[/b] Yes, his Self-Disapproval was. It [b]pained[/b] him to see
the mother suffer. He was sorry he had done a thing which brought
[b]him[/b] pain. It did not occur to him to think of the mother when he was
misteaching the boy, for he was absorbed in providing [b]pleasure[/b] for
himself, then. Providing it by satisfying what he believed to be a call of
duty.
[b]Young Man:[/b] Call it what you please, it is to me a case of [b]awakened
conscience[/b]. That awakened conscience could never get itself into that
species of trouble again. A cure like that is a [b]permanent[/b] cure.
[b]Old Man:[/b] Pardon - I had not finished the story. We are creatures of
[b]outside influences[/b] - we originate [b]nothing[/b] within. Whenever we
take a new line of thought and drift into a new line of belief and action,
the impulse is [b]always[/b] suggested from the [b]outside[/b]. Remorse so
preyed upon the infidel that it dissolved his harshness toward the boy's
religion and made him come to regard it with tolerance, next with kindness,
for the boy’s sake and the mother’s. Finally he found himself examining it.
>From that moment his progress in his new trend was steady and rapid. He
became a believing Christian. And now his remorse for having robbed the
dying boy of his faith and his salvation was bitterer than ever. It gave him
no rest, no peace. He [/b]must[/b] have rest and peace--it is the law of
nature. There seemed but one way to get it; he must devote himself to saving
imperiled souls. He became a missionary. He landed in a pagan country ill
and helpless. A native widow took him into her humble home and nursed him
back to convalescence. Then her young boy was taken hopelessly ill, and the
grateful missionary helped her tend him. Here was his first opportunity to
repair a part of the wrong done to the other boy by doing a precious service
for this one by undermining his foolish faith in his false gods. He was
successful. But the dying boy in his last moments reproached him and said:
“[b]I believed, and was happy in it; you have taken my belief away, and my
comfort. Now I have nothing left, and I die miserable; for the things which
you have told me do not take the place of that which I have lost. [/b]”
And the mother, also, reproached the missionary, and said: “[b]My child is
forever lost, and my heart is broken. How could you do this cruel thing? We
had done you no harm, but only kindness; we made our house your home, you
were welcome to all we had, and this is our reward.[/b]”
The heart of the missionary was filled with remorse for what he had done,
and he said: “[b]It was wrong - I see it now; but I was only trying to do
him good. In my view he was in error; it seemed my duty to teach him the
truth.[/b]”
Then the mother said: “[b]I had taught him, all his little life, what I
believed to be the truth, and in his believing faith both of us were happy.
Now he is dead - and lost; and I am miserable. Our faith came down to us
through centuries of believing ancestors; what right had you, or any one, to
disturb it? Where was your honor, where was your shame?[/b]”
The missionary's anguish of remorse and sense of treachery were as bitter
and persecuting and unappeasable, now, as they had been in the former case.
The story is finished. What is your comment?
[b]Young Man:[/b] The man’s conscience is a fool! It was morbid. It didn’t
know right from wrong.
[b]Old Man:[/b] I am not sorry to hear you say that. If you grant that
[b]one[/b] man’s conscience doesn't know right from wrong, it is an
admission that there are others like it. This single admission pulls down
the whole doctrine of infallibility of judgment in consciences. Meantime
there is one thing which I ask you to notice.
[b]Young Man:[/b] What is that?
[b]Old Man:[/b] That in both cases the man’s [b]act[/b] gave him no
spiritual discomfort, and that he was quite satisfied with it and got
pleasure out of it. But afterward when it resulted in [b]pain[/b] to
[b]him[/b], he was sorry. Sorry it had inflicted pain upon the others,
[b]but for no reason under the sun except that their pain gave him pain[/b].
Our consciences take [b]no[/b] notice of pain inflicted upon others until it
reaches a point where it gives pain to [b]us[/b]. In [b]all[/b] cases
without exception we are absolutely indifferent to another person's pain
until his sufferings make us uncomfortable. Many an infidel would not have
been troubled by that Christian mother’s distress. Don’t you believe that?
[b]Young Man:[/b] Yes. You might almost say it of the [b]average[/b]
infidel, I think.
[b]Old Man:[/b] And many a missionary, sternly fortified by his sense of
duty, would not have been troubled by the pagan mother’s distress - Jesuit
missionaries in Canada in the early French times, for instance; see episodes
quoted by Parkman.
[b]Young Man:[/b] Well, let us adjourn. Where have we arrived?
[b]Old Man:[/b] At this. That we (mankind) have ticketed ourselves with a
number of qualities to which we have given misleading names. Love, Hate,
Charity, Compassion, Avarice, Benevolence, and so on. I mean we attach
misleading [b]meanings[/b] to the names. They are all forms of
self-contentment, self-gratification, but the names so disguise them that
they distract our attention from the fact. Also we have smuggled a word into
the dictionary which ought not to be there at all--Self-Sacrifice. It
describes a thing which does not exist. But worst of all, we ignore and
never mention the Sole Impulse which dictates and compels a man's every act:
the imperious necessity of securing his own approval, in every emergency
and at all costs. To it we owe all that we are. It is our breath, our
heart, our blood. It is our only spur, our whip, our goad, our only
impelling power; we have no other. Without it we should be mere inert
images, corpses; no one would do anything, there would be no progress, the
world would stand still. We ought to stand reverently uncovered when the
name of that stupendous power is uttered.
[b]Young Man:[/b] I am not convinced.
[b]Old Man:[/b] You will be when you think.
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